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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of Edward Snowden’s revelations about the systematic 
acquisition by the National Security Agency (NSA) of telephone metadata 
and internet information—and about cooperation between the NSA and its 
counterpart in the United Kingdom, the Government Communications 
Headquarters (GCHQ), in such acquisition—the British Foreign Secretary, 
William Hague, addressed the House of Commons.1  As Foreign Secretary, 
Hague was responsible for issuing warrants to GCHQ for interception of 
international and wholly foreign communications.  In his prepared remarks, 
Hague said that: 
At [the heart of the strong framework of democratic 
accountability and oversight that governs the use of secret 
intelligence in the United Kingdom] are two Acts of 
Parliament: the Intelligence Services Act 1994 and the 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.2  The Acts 
require GCHQ and other agencies to seek authorisation for 
their operations from a Secretary of State, normally the Foreign 
Secretary or Home Secretary. . . .  This combination of needing 
a warrant from one of the most senior members of the 
Government, decided on the basis of detailed legal advice, and 
such decisions being reviewed by independent commissioners 
and implemented by agencies with strong legal and ethical 
frameworks, with the addition of parliamentary scrutiny by the 
[Intelligence and Security Committee]3 . . . provides one of the 
strongest systems of checks and balances and democratic 
accountability for secret intelligence anywhere in the world.4 
In the discussion that followed, the Foreign Secretary took questions from 
members of Parliament.  Among the questioners was Labour MP Jack Straw, 
                                                                                                                   
 1 William Hague, Statement to the House of Commons (June 10, 2013), 564 Parl. Deb. 
H.C. (6th ser.) 31 (U.K.)  
 2 See infra notes 204–10, 217–32 and accompanying text.  
 3 The Intelligence and Security Committee was created in 1994 to enhance parliamentary 
oversight of the work of the various intelligence agencies, including GCHQ.  See Intelligence 
Services Act, 1994, ch. 13 (Eng.). 
 4 William Hague, Statement to the House of Commons, supra note 1, at col. 32. 
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a former Home Secretary (1997–2001), Foreign Secretary (2001–2006), and 
Secretary of State for Justice (2007–2010).  Straw asked Hague whether 
the Secretary of State [would] accept that many of our allies, 
leaving aside the United States, are astonished by the degree of 
control and supervision of our system of ministerial oversight, 
oversight by judicially qualified commissioners and oversight 
by the [Intelligence and Security Committee], which surpasses 
that of most other western democracies?5 
Hague responded that “[t]he right honorable Gentleman is absolutely 
right. . . . [A]s he knows very well, the system of checks and balances and 
scrutiny that we have is among the strongest in the world; it could be the 
strongest in the world.”6 
In the United States, Snowden’s revelations were followed by, among 
other things, a series of press releases by the Director of National 
Intelligence, James Clapper.  In a statement released on June 6, 2013, 
Clapper said that “[t]here is a robust legal regime in place governing all 
activities conducted pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 
which ensures that those activities comply with the Constitution and laws 
and appropriately protect privacy and civil liberties.”7  In a similar vein, in a 
blog post on June 11, 2013, security expert and former NSA Inspector 
General Joel Brenner wrote that: 
The United States has the most expensive, elaborate, and multi-
tiered intelligence oversight apparatus of any nation on Earth.  
We have well staffed intelligence committees in the House and 
Senate.  The National Security Division of the Justice 
Department rides herd on the intelligence agencies.  The FISA 
Court gets detailed reports of collection under its orders.  The 
NSA has a robust compliance organization.  It also has an 
inspector general with wide powers operating outside the chain 
                                                                                                                   
 5 Id. at col. 38. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Press Release, James R. Clapper, Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, DNI Statement on Recent 
Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information (June 6, 2013), available at http://www. 
dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/191-press-releases-2012/868-dni-statement-on-
recent-unauthorized-disclosures-of-classified-information?tmpl=component&format=pdf.  
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of command.  None of our European allies controls intelligence 
activities with comparable rigor.8 
It is understandable that officials and experts in both Britain and the 
United States would be anxious to stress the superiority of their respective 
systems of authorization and oversight of interception of communications.  
Presumably they cannot all be right, but this does not preclude the possibility 
that policy makers in both countries have established satisfactory 
mechanisms for overseeing the surveillance activities of executive branch 
officials, and have thereby arguably, if approximately, realized the proverbial 
goal of striking a “proper balance” between liberty and security. 
This Article will examine the origin and development of modern 
arrangements for authorization and oversight of interception of 
communications within the United Kingdom.  It will then venture some 
comparative conclusions.  In particular, it will examine the role of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in shaping the contours of British 
surveillance law and in passing judgment on the “Convention-compatibility,” 
pursuant to the court’s power to enforce the human rights provisions of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), of the surveillance regime 
that Britain eventually adopted.9  In addition, the Article will compare the 
surveillance regimes of Britain and the United States with reference to both 
their statutory underpinnings and available statistical information about their 
practical operation. 
                                                                                                                   
 8 Joel Brenner, Power, Secrecy, and Intelligence Oversight, LAWFARE (June 11, 2013; 8:22 
AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/06/power-secrecy-and-intelligence-oversight. 
 9 The European Convention is a treaty among member states of the Council of Europe 
(COE).  See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR], available at http://conventions.coe.int/ 
Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm.  It was opened for signature in Rome in 1950, and came 
into force in 1953.  Id.  It consists today of thirteen substantive human rights guarantees 
enforceable against the forty-seven current members of the COE (all of which are also state 
parties to the Convention).  Id. 
  The European Court of Human Rights began operation in 1959 and, since 1998, has been 
solely responsible for enforcing the European Convention.  Aisha Gani, What is the European 
Convention on Human Rights, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 1, 2015, 10:53 PM), http://www.theguard 
ian.com/law/2014/oct/03/what-is-european-convention-on-human-rights-echr.  The court sits 
in Strasbourg, France, and currently consists of one judge from each of the member states of 
the COE.  EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (ECTHR), THE ECHR IN 50 QUESTIONS 4 
(Feb. 2014), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/50Questions_ENG.pdf. The 
court devolves into “Chambers” of seven judges—and in important cases into a “Grand 
Chamber” of seventeen judges—for the purpose of deciding cases. Id. at 5.  
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It is important at the outset to emphasize the limited scope of the ensuing 
discussion.  The phrase “interception of communications” has many 
meanings.  In particular, questions of the legality of government access to the 
content of communications—the core of the present analysis—bleed 
inexorably into questions regarding the legal status of non-content 
“communications data,” such as phone numbers and email addresses, and of 
various categories of “stored communications.”  In addition, both 
governments and private-sector organizations are steadily perfecting their 
ability to engage in “data mining” of the vast amounts of heretofore largely 
inaccessible information that is now available in digital form.  Finally, trends 
in surveillance practices cannot easily be separated from overarching 
concerns about the demise of privacy in modern society and the role of 
technology in transforming the relationship between citizens, private-sector 
institutions, and the state.10 
The discussion that follows will not attempt to explore more than a small 
corner of the overall problem of government surveillance and privacy rights.  
Analysis will be confined to examining the real-time acquisition of the 
content of telephone conversations, that is, “traditional wiretapping,” or what 
today might even be called “old-fashioned wiretapping.”  In addition, the 
Article will focus primarily, although not exclusively, on the history and 
modern content of the law of telephone wiretapping in Britain and the United 
States.11 
                                                                                                                   
 10 Discussions of the expanding scope of both governmental and non-governmental 
surveillance are proliferating rapidly.  See, e.g., Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of 
Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934 (2013); ERIC METCALFE, JUSTICE, FREEDOM FROM 
SUSPICION: SURVEILLANCE REFORM FOR A DIGITAL AGE (2011); SHANE HARRIS, THE 
WATCHERS: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S SURVEILLANCE STATE (2010); SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE 
CONSTITUTION, SURVEILLANCE: CITIZENS AND THE STATE, REPORT, 2008–09, H.L. 18-I (U.K.); 
HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, A SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY?, 2007–08, H.C. 58-I (U.K.); Jack M. 
Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2008). 
 11 This Article will not undertake a systematic comparative analysis of wiretapping in 
numerous jurisdictions.  For examples of comparative studies that encompass a broader or 
different spectrum of countries, see Mark H. Gitenstein, Nine Democracies and the Problems 
of Detention, Surveillance, and Interrogation, in LEGISLATING THE WAR ON TERROR: AN 
AGENDA FOR REFORM 7–42 (Benjamin Wittes ed., 2009); Paul M. Schwartz, Evaluating 
Telecommunications Surveillance in Germany: The Lessons of the Max Planck Institute’s 
Study, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1244 (2004) (reviewing a study of telephone wiretapping in 
seventeen countries, including thirteen European countries and Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, and the United States); LAURENCE LUSTGARTEN & IAN LEIGH, IN FROM THE COLD: 
NATIONAL SECURITY AND PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY 39–126 (1994) (comparing Britain, 
Canada, and Australia).  
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Finally, the Article will be confined to examining “domestic” or 
“internal” surveillance, as distinct from “strategic” or “external” surveillance 
(often described as the collection of “signals intelligence”).  “Domestic” or 
“internal” surveillance is usually understood to encompass the use within 
national boundaries of electronic devices and/or covert human operatives to 
target individuals who are themselves located within the national boundary.  
“Strategic” or “external” surveillance, on the other hand, usually refers to the 
use of surveillance capabilities to monitor international or wholly external 
communications.  The distinction between the two forms of surveillance is 
almost certainly becoming less tenable with every passing day.  However, 
legislative enactments and court decisions in both the United States and 
Europe have for many years distinguished between surveillance that consists 
of tracking individuals through deployment of domestic surveillance 
capabilities—even if the individuals are non-citizens or the threats they pose 
originate in foreign countries—and surveillance strategies aimed at 
systematically monitoring international or wholly external communications 
or targeting persons located outside of national boundaries.12  The discussion 
                                                                                                                   
 12 The national agencies primarily responsible for the conduct of external or strategic 
surveillance include America’s National Security Agency, Britain’s Government 
Communications Headquarters, and Germany’s Foreign Intelligence Service 
(Bundesnachrichtendienst).  The ECtHR examined and upheld the “Convention 
compatibility” of German procedures for the conduct of external surveillance in Weber and 
Saravia v. Germany, App. No. 54934/00, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006), available at http:// 
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-76586.  Procedural arrangements for the conduct of external 
surveillance by GCHQ were challenged in the European Court and found wanting, although 
not fundamentally so, in Liberty v. United Kingdom, App. No. 58243/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(2008), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-87207. 
  More recently, in response to claims by ten human rights organizations—including 
Liberty, Privacy International, and Amnesty International—the UK’s Investigatory Powers 
Tribunal (IPT) issued a series of public rulings. The claimants alleged that the surveillance 
activities of GCHQ, including its bulk collection of both the content and metadata of 
telephone and internet communications, and its collaboration with the NSA in such collection, 
were incompatible with Article 8 of the ECHR and illegal under the UK’s regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA 2000).  In two initial rulings, the IPT rejected most of 
the claimants’ allegations, including the core allegation that GCHQ’s bulk collection activities 
were incompatible with Article 8 and illegal under RIPA 2000.  See Liberty v. GCHQ, [2014] 
UKIPTrib13/77-H, available at http://www.ipt-uk.com/docs/IPT_13_168-173_H.pdf; Liberty 
v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, [2015] UKIPTrib 13/77-H, 
available at http://www.ipt-uk.com/docs/Liberty_Ors_Judgment_6Feb15.pdf.  In a third 
ruling, the IPT held that interception of emails of two of the ten NGOs—the Egyptian 
Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR) and the South African-based Legal Resources Centre 
(LRC)—had been lawful under RIPA but had breached Article 8 because of GCHQ’s failure 
to follow its own procedures governing the length of time during which emails were retained 
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that follows will be confined, insofar as it is possible to do so, to the 
former.13 
The remainder of this Article will be divided into four parts.  Part II will 
briefly explore the transnational legal environment with which British policy 
makers were confronted when they reexamined their interception practices in 
the late 1970s.  Most prominent in this respect were various court decisions 
and legislative enactments of which the surveillance regimes of the United 
States and Germany were comprised. 
Part III will describe the evolution of surveillance law in the United 
Kingdom between 1979 and 2000.  Part III.A will examine a 1979 challenge 
in the British High Court to then-existent non-statutory arrangements for 
telephone wiretapping by the police.  Fallout from the court’s decision 
culminated six years later in Parliament’s passage of the Interception of 
Communications Act 1985.  Part III.B will examine Parliament’s response to 
the need for additional surveillance-related reforms in the years between 
1985 and 2000 and its eventual decision to consolidate statutory regulation of 
a spectrum of surveillance powers in the omnibus Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000. 
Part IV will examine the ECtHR’s decision in Kennedy v. United 
Kingdom (2010).  The case served as a vehicle for the court’s decision 
                                                                                                                   
and the way in which particular emails were selected for further examination.  The tribunal 
informed the other eight claimants in the litigation that “no determination had been made in 
[their] favour,” leaving them in doubt about whether their communications had been 
intercepted in the first place.  See Liberty v. GCHQ, [2015] UKIPTrib 13/77-H-2, available at 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2108743/final-liberty-ors-open-
determination.pdf.  See also infra notes 180–82 and accompanying text.  On July 1, 2015, in 
an exceedingly embarrassing development, the tribunal sent an email to Amnesty International 
admitting that it was Amnesty rather than the Egyptian organization whose emails had been 
lawfully collected but mishandled by GCHQ after their initial collection.  This, of course, 
constituted official proof that GCHQ had been systematically collecting Amnesty’s emails and 
conceivably examining and making further use of some of them.  See Owen Bowcott, GCHQ 
spied on Amnesty International, tribunal tells group in email, THE GUARDIAN (July 1, 2015), 
available at http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jul/01/gchq-spied-amnesty-internatio 
nal-tribunal-email.  In the meantime, on April 10, 2015, all ten organizations submitted an 
application to the ECtHR challenging the IPT’s initial rulings upholding the legality and 
Convention-compatibility of GCHQ’s bulk collection activities.  See The European Court of 
Human Rights Application: 10 Human Rights Organisations v United Kingdom, Additional 
Submissions on the Facts and Complaints, AMNESTY INT’L (Apr. 9, 2015), https://www.amne 
sty.org/en/documents/ior60/1415/2015/en/.  
 13 Edward Snowden’s revelations have primarily focused on the conduct of external 
surveillance and the bulk collection of telephone and internet metadata by the NSA, GCHQ, 
and other intelligence agencies.  The ensuing analysis will therefore not address them in any 
detail. 
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upholding the Convention-compatibility of the interception regime initially 
placed on a statutory footing by Parliament in the Interception of 
Communications Act 1985 and re-enacted, with minor modifications, in the 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. 
Finally, Part V will compare the British and American approaches to 
authorization and oversight of interception of communications.  By now, the 
British system of executive warrants is well established, and has received the 
imprimatur of the ECtHR.  It does not exist in a vacuum, however, but 
operates in conjunction with a set of quasi-judicial mechanisms for 
overseeing executive branch surveillance activities.  In the United States, 
ordinary courts and the FISA Court continue to be solely responsible for pre-
approving executive branch surveillance and for reviewing the lawfulness of 
such surveillance when it is challenged.  Which system does a better job of 
enabling government to combat crime and protect national security, while 
simultaneously constraining abuses of executive power and safeguarding 
citizens’ rights, remains a surprisingly open question. 
II.  CONSTRUCTING AN INTERCEPTION REGIME IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: 
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT 
The British were forced by circumstances to reexamine their approach to 
interception of communications in the late 1970s.14  At that time, awareness 
of foreign judicial precedent was growing among human rights activists in 
many jurisdictions, including Britain.  In addition, the decision-making 
institutions of the Council of Europe, including the ECtHR, were becoming 
more assertive.  The upshot was that British judges and other policy makers 
were obliged to respond to transnational developments in surveillance law 
and privacy rights that in earlier decades might have been dismissed as 
irrelevant.  The two most prominent bodies of non-British law were the 
constitutional rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court and the emerging 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR. 
                                                                                                                   
 14 See infra Part III. 
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A.  The Fourth Amendment and Wiretapping in the United States 
1.  Katz v. United States 
In 1967, in Katz v. United States,15 the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
wiretapping and third party bugging by law enforcement officials requires a 
judicial warrant based on probable cause.  Katz brought to a close a period of 
nearly forty years during which wiretapping had not been subject to Fourth 
Amendment restraint.  In the Court’s initial encounter with wiretapping, 
Olmstead v. United States,16 Chief Justice Taft, writing for a five-to-four 
majority, noted that “[t]here was no entry of the houses or offices of the 
defendants,”17 nor any seizure of “tangible material effects.”18  As a result, he 
concluded, “the wire tapping here disclosed did not amount to a search or 
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”19  Some four decades 
later—in Katz, a case involving a variation on the technique of third party 
bugging20—the Court concluded that the government’s activities “violated 
the privacy upon which [the petitioner] justifiably relied . . . and thus 
constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.”21  The Court then held that “the usual requirement of advance 
authorization by a magistrate upon a showing of probable cause” would 
henceforth be “a constitutional precondition of the kind of electronic 
surveillance involved in this case.”22 
2.  Title III (1968) 
Seven months after the Katz decision, Congress enacted the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Title III of which remains the 
principal federal legislation regulating interception of communications in 
                                                                                                                   
 15 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 16 277 U.S. 438 (1928).  
 17 Id. at 464. 
 18 Id. at 466. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Law enforcement agents had overheard one end of a telephone conversation by attaching 
a device to the outside of a public telephone booth.  Id. at 348. 
 21 Id. at 353. 
 22 Id. at 358–59. 
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ordinary criminal cases.23  As amended by the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act of 1986, Title III makes it a crime for “any person [to] 
intentionally intercept . . . any wire, oral, or electronic communication.”24  
However, the Attorney General or other specially designated high-level 
Department of Justice officials “may authorize an application to a Federal 
judge of competent jurisdiction for . . . an order authorizing or approving the 
interception of wire or oral communications by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation [or other federal agency] when such interception may provide 
[evidence of the commission of various specified federal offenses].”25  The 
judge to whom an application is made is authorized to enter an ex parte order 
approving interception if he or she determines that “there is probable cause 
for belief that an individual is committing, has committed, or is about to 
commit a [specified] offense.”26  
Title III contains a mandatory—and rather generous—post-surveillance 
notification provision.  Under section 2518(8)(d),  
[w]ithin a reasonable time but not later than ninety days . . . the 
issuing or denying judge shall cause to be served, on the 
persons named in the order or the application, and such other 
parties to intercepted communications as the judge may 
determine in his discretion that is in the interest of justice, an 
inventory which shall include notice of . . . the fact of the entry 
of the order or the application [and the fact that] 
communications were or were not intercepted.27 
The judge may also “in his discretion make available to such person or his 
counsel for inspection such portions of the intercepted communications, 
applications and orders as the judge determines to be in the interest of 
justice.”28 
                                                                                                                   
 23 Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, 82 Stat. 197, 211–25 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2510–2522 (2012), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (2012)).  For further in depth discussion, see Patricia 
L. Bellia, Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw’s Lens, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1375 (2004). 
 24 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a). 
 25 Id. § 2516(1). 
 26 Id. § 2518(3)(a). 
 27 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d)(1), (3). 
 28 Id. § 2518(8)(d).  For further discussion of the post-surveillance notification requirements 
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, see infra notes 48–54 and accompanying 
text.  For discussion of the post-surveillance notification requirements of German and British 
interception law, see infra notes 61–80, 169–85, 252–70 and accompanying text. 
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Title III contains a statutory exclusionary rule and numerous other 
safeguards against executive branch abuse of the power to wiretap in 
criminal cases.  The safeguards are so numerous, in fact, that congressional 
regulation of such surveillance has been described as imposing “a super-
warrant requirement for telephones,”29 and the Department of Justice itself 
readily admits that “several of Title III’s provisions are more restrictive than 
what is required by the Fourth Amendment.”30 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Katz and Congress’s passage of Title III 
fundamentally revamped the law of electronic surveillance in the United 
States.  In particular, they firmly established the necessity of judicial pre-
approval of executive branch use of electronic surveillance in ordinary 
criminal investigations.  What neither Katz nor Title III resolved, however, 
was the question of executive branch power to wiretap or engage in other 
forms of covert surveillance to protect against alleged threats to national 
security. 
3.  United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith) 
The Supreme Court addressed the existence and scope of a national 
security exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement in United 
States v. U.S. District Court (Keith).31  Keith involved an alleged plot by 
domestic radicals to bomb a CIA office in Ann Arbor, Michigan.32 The 
Nixon Administration argued that the government was exempt from the need 
to obtain a judicial warrant whenever it believed it was dealing not with 
ordinary criminal activity but instead with a domestic threat to national 
security.33  Justice Powell, writing for the majority, diplomatically but firmly 
rejected the government’s position.  He acknowledged the government’s 
concerns—that the collection of intelligence is different from the gathering 
of evidence,34 that courts would be ill-equipped to make probable cause 
determinations in national security cases,35 and that the need to request 
judicial approval would jeopardize the secrecy of intelligence-gathering 
                                                                                                                   
 29 Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother That 
Isn’t, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 607, 630 (2003). 
 30 U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, TITLE 9, ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, SECTION 9-7.100, 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/7mcrm.htm. 
 31 407 U.S. 297 (1972). 
 32 Id. at 299. 
 33 Id. at 303–04. 
 34 Id. at 318–19. 
 35 Id. at 319. 
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operations36—but concluded that such concerns “do not justify departure in 
this case from the customary Fourth Amendment requirement of judicial 
approval prior to initiation of a search or surveillance.”37 
Justice Powell ended his opinion by noting that the Court’s decision was 
confined to “the domestic aspects of national security” and did not purport to 
address “the issues which may be involved with respect to activities of 
foreign powers or their agents.”38  He also noted that even though the Court 
was holding “that prior judicial approval is required for the type of domestic 
security surveillance involved in this case,”39 Congress might decide that 
“the application and affidavit showing probable cause [in domestic security 
cases] need not follow the exact requirements of [Title III]” and also that 
“the request for prior court authorization could, in sensitive cases, be made to 
any member of a specially designated court.”40 
Justice Powell thus extended an invitation to Congress to implement the 
reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment in domestic security 
cases by enacting legislation that required prior judicial approval of 
electronic surveillance but exempted executive officials from the rigorous 
demands of Title III.  Congress did not immediately respond.  When it did, 
however, it produced legislation that closely tracked Powell’s suggestions.  
What Congress also did, however, was to implement those suggestions in 
legislation aimed at regulating executive branch use of electronic 
surveillance in foreign security cases—that is, addressing the constitutional 
issue upon which the Court had expressly refrained from passing judgment. 
4.  Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 197841 
In the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), Congress 
created a seven-judge special court, known as the “FISA Court” or the 
“FISC,” which was given jurisdiction to “hear applications for and grant 
orders approving electronic surveillance anywhere within the United States 
under the procedures [established by FISA].”42  Orders may be sought from 
                                                                                                                   
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. at 321. 
 38 Id. at 321–22. 
 39 Id. at 324. 
 40 Id. at 323. 
 41 Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–
1885c (2006 & Supp. III 2009)).  
 42 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(1).  The FISA Court was subsequently enlarged from seven to 
eleven judges by section 208 of the USA PATRIOT Act.  See Uniting and Strengthening 
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the court when the target of proposed surveillance is either a “foreign power” 
or “an agent of a foreign power,”43 and “a significant purpose of the 
surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information.”44  The judge to 
whom an application is made is authorized to issue an order if he or she finds 
that “there is probable cause to believe that [the] target of the electronic 
surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.”45 
Applications to the FISA Court ordinarily originate with the FBI, but are 
reviewed by Department of Justice lawyers before presentation to the 
Attorney General for his or her approval.46  Since 2006, responsibility for 
preparing and filing applications for FISA Court orders has been assigned to 
the National Security Division of the Justice Department.47 
In contrast to Title III, FISA contains nothing resembling a “mandatory” 
or “generous” mechanism for post-surveillance notification of targeted 
persons.  Under FISA, the target of electronic surveillance does not become 
an “aggrieved person” entitled to notification unless the government intends 
to enter into evidence any information obtained or derived from the 
surveillance “in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding.”48  In addition, 
whenever an aggrieved person files a motion “to discover or obtain 
applications or orders or other materials relating to electronic surveillance”—
as a prelude, presumably, to filing a motion to suppress FISA-derived 
evidence—the Attorney General is authorized to file an affidavit under oath 
                                                                                                                   
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA 
PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 208, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) [hereinafter the USA 
PATRIOT Act]. 
 43 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(3)(A). 
 44 Id. § 1804(a)(6)(B). 
 45 Id. § 1805(a)(2)(A).  For detailed discussions of FISA, see Americo R. Cinquegrana, The 
Walls (and Wires) Have Ears: The Background and First Ten Years of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 793 (1989); Patricia L. Bellia, The 
‘Lone Wolf’ Amendment and the Future of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 50 VILL. L. 
REV. 425 (2005); ELIZABETH GOITEIN & FAIZA PATEL, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, WHAT 
WENT WRONG WITH THE FISA COURT (2015), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/ 
sites/default/files/analysis/What_Went_%20Wrong_With_The_FISA_Court.pdf.  
 46 National Security Division Sections and Offices, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www. 
justice.gov/nsd/sections-offices. 
 47 USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, 
§ 106(b), 120 Stat. 192, 196 (2006) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A)).  See also David 
S. Kris, Law Enforcement as a Counterterrorism Tool, 5 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 1, 4–8 
(2011). 
 48 50 U.S.C. § 1806(c).  Under the statute, an “aggrieved person” is defined as “a person 
who is the target of an electronic surveillance or any other person whose communications or 
activities were subject to electronic surveillance.” Id. § 1801(k). 
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with the court “that disclosure or an adversary hearing would harm the 
national security of the United States.”49  The court is instructed to respond 
by “review[ing] in camera and ex parte the application, order, and such other 
materials relating to the surveillance as may be necessary to determine 
whether the surveillance of the aggrieved person was lawfully authorized and 
conducted.”50  In making this determination, the court is authorized to 
disclose to the aggrieved person “portions” of the relevant materials, but 
“only where such disclosure is necessary to make an accurate determination 
of the legality of the surveillance.”51 
Since FISA’s passage in 1979, it has been exceedingly rare for FISA-
based surveillance to culminate in a criminal prosecution or other judicial 
proceeding.  As a result, persons targeted for such surveillance are unlikely 
to be aware of that fact.  In addition, given the phrasing of section 1806(f), 
criminal defendants who do seek disclosure of FISA-derived evidence are 
unlikely to succeed.  Prior to 2014, no judge had ever ordered the 
government to disclose to a defendant the materials on which the FISA 
Court’s warrant or warrants had been based.52  In 2014, a district judge 
ordered disclosure for the first time,53 but the decision was emphatically 
reversed by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.54 
Although the interception regime established by FISA does require prior 
judicial approval of wiretapping and other forms of electronic surveillance, it 
otherwise is not notably transparent.  In the United States, targets of FISA 
                                                                                                                   
 49 Id. § 1806(f). 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Patricia L. Bellia, Designing Surveillance Law, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 293, 341 (2011) (noting 
that “more that 28,000 FISA applications and renewals [have been] granted since 1979,” that 
“challenges to introduction of FISA-derived evidence or demands for disclosure of [such] 
evidence have been raised in approximately thirty-five cases,” and that “none of these 
challenges has been successful”). 
 53 United States v. Daoud, No. 12CR723, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10716 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 
2014).  
 54 United States v. Daoud, 755 F.3d 479 (7th Cir.), supplemented, 761 F.3d 678 (7th Cir. 
2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1456 (2015).  The Seventh Circuit concluded that the district 
judge failed to fulfil “her obligation to evaluate the parties’ allegations in light of the FISA 
materials to determine whether she could assess the legality of those materials herself, without 
disclosure of them to [the defendant’s] lawyers.”  755 F.3d at 483.  The court then held that 
disclosure of the classified materials was not necessary and that the government’s 
investigation “did not violate FISA.”  Id. at 485.  On July 14, 2014, the Seventh Circuit issued 
a heavily redacted classified opinion explaining its conclusions, see id. 761 F.3d 678, and on 
February 23, 2015, the Supreme Court, without opinion, denied the defendant’s petition for a 
writ of certiorari.  See id. 135 S. Ct. 1456. 
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surveillance are not notified of that fact unless the government intends to 
initiate some form of judicial proceeding, and no defendant who has tried to 
gain access to FISA-derived evidence has ever succeeded in doing so.  This 
fact should be kept in mind in evaluating the British approach to interception 
of communications, which strikes many observers as being exceptionally 
secretive.  Putting to one side the relative merits of a dispersed system of 
judicial warrants versus a centralized system of executive warrants, it is clear 
that overwhelming secrecy surrounds both the British and the American 
approaches to authorization and oversight of domestic surveillance of targets 
perceived to constitute a national security threat.55 
5.  Conclusion 
By 1978, the necessity of judicial oversight of the executive branch’s use 
of electronic surveillance was firmly established in American law.  In the late 
1960s, both Katz and Title III made plain that wiretapping in ordinary 
criminal cases was subject to judicial oversight.  In 1972, Keith extended the 
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement to executive branch wiretapping 
in cases involving an alleged domestic threat to national security, holding 
that such surveillance “requires an appropriate prior warrant procedure.”56  
Six years later, in FISA, Congress translated the Supreme Court’s insistence 
on “an appropriate prior warrant procedure” into legislation that addressed 
foreign threats to national security within the United States by requiring the 
government to obtain judicial pre-approval for wiretapping of any person 
suspected of being “an agent of a foreign power.”57  In so doing, Congress 
put in place the final components of a national policy in which internal or 
domestic use of wiretapping and other forms of electronic surveillance, in 
both criminal investigations and intelligence-gathering operations, is 
governed by the Fourth Amendment, and the commencement of surveillance 
by executive branch officials in individual cases is contingent upon the 
acquisition of a judicial warrant. 
                                                                                                                   
 55 The secrecy surrounding the warrant-granting process in the United Kingdom is 
discussed in infra notes 114, 169–85, 252–70 and accompanying text. 
 56 United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. at 320. 
 57 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(3)(A). 
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B.  The European Convention and Wiretapping: Klass v. Germany 
Presumably by sheer coincidence, the year in which the U.S. Congress 
passed FISA was also the year in which the issue of executive branch 
wiretapping became the focus, for the first time, of European-level human 
rights scrutiny.  The vehicle, Klass v. Germany, involved a challenge to 
German surveillance legislation alleged to violate Article 8 of the ECHR, 
and it resulted in the ECtHR’s first-ever decision on the interplay between 
internal surveillance regimes and fundamental human rights law.58 
1.  National Security and the Interception Power in Germany 
In 1968, the German Parliament enacted national legislation to govern the 
use of telephone wiretapping by both the police in criminal investigations 
and intelligence-gathering officials in national security investigations.59  The 
legislation, known as the “G10 statute,” established a bifurcated system.  
Whereas wiretapping by the police required judicial pre-approval,  
wiretapping by intelligence-gathering officials was governed by separate 
provisions designed to enable the government to respond to perceived threats 
with greater speed and secrecy.60  
                                                                                                                   
 58 Klass v. Germany, App. No. 5029/71, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57510.  
 59 Gesetz zur Beschränkung des Brief-, Post- und Fernmeldegeheimnisses [Restrictions on 
the Secrecy of the Mail, Post, and Telecommunications], Artikel 10-Gesetz [G-10] [G-10 
Statute], Aug. 13, 1968, Bundesgesetzblatt I [BGBI. I] at 949 (Ger.).  The Act consisted of a 
series of antiterrorism measures enacted in response to an upsurge of terrorist activities 
occurring at the time.  See James G. Carr, Wiretapping in West Germany, 29 AM. J. COMP. L. 
607 (1981); Craig M. Bradley, The Exclusionary Rule in Germany, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1032, 
1054 (1983).  
 60 Article II of the statute dealt with wiretapping for law enforcement purposes and is 
incorporated as sections 100a-101 of the German Code of Criminal Procedure Code 
(Strafprozessordnug).  See Carr, supra note 59, at 607 n.2; Paul M. Schwartz, German and 
U.S. Telecommunications Privacy Law: Legal Regulation of Domestic Law Enforcement 
Surveillance, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 751, 791–94 (2003).  Article I of the statute authorized the use 
of wiretapping for intelligence and national security purposes.  The common reference to the 
law as the “G10 statute”—or simply as the “G10”—was based on the fact that passage of the 
law was immediately preceded by the passage by Parliament of amendments to Article 10 of 
the Constitution of the Federal Republic (the Grundgesetz or “Basic Law”).  The dual purpose 
of the amendments was to exempt the government from the need to get a judicial warrant in 
national security cases and to confer prospective constitutional legitimacy on the G10.  Klass, 
App. No. 58243/00, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. paras. 15-25.   
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The G10 authorized procedures for wiretapping in national security cases 
that differed in two principal ways from the rules that governed police 
wiretapping.  First, whereas post-surveillance notification was the norm in 
criminal cases, the statute prohibited notifying anyone who had been targeted 
for national security surveillance.61  Second, the statute created a mechanism 
for intelligence-gathering officials to initiate surveillance without receiving a 
judge’s pre-approval.  At the federal level, the statute provided that requests 
for permission to wiretap could originate with various agencies responsible 
for counterintelligence and military defense.  Two executive officials, the 
Minister of the Interior (in the case of domestic or internal surveillance) and 
the Minister of Defense (in the case of strategic or external surveillance), 
were authorized to issue warrants and were required to do so personally.62   
Two bodies were responsible for overseeing the ministers’ decisions to 
issue warrants.  The first was a five-person board consisting of members of 
Parliament representing a cross-section of political parties, including the 
opposition, which was responsible for reviewing a semi-annual report 
prepared by each of the ministers (G10 Board).63  An additional and more 
important responsibility of the G10 Board was to appoint a three-person 
“G10 Commission.”64  Under the law as written, each minister was “bound 
every month to provide . . . an account [to the Commission] of the measures 
he has ordered.”65  In addition, the Commission was authorized to review 
wiretap orders and to entertain applications from persons who believed 
themselves to be under surveillance.  The Commission could require 
immediate termination of any interception order which it deemed “illegal or 
unnecessary.”66 
The G10 statute was challenged by a group of public officials and lawyers 
who alleged that it violated Article 8 of the European Convention.67  Article 
8 consists of two paragraphs.  The first paragraph guarantees that 
“[e]veryone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
                                                                                                                   
 61 Klass, App. No. 58243/00, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 10.  
 62 Id. para. 18. 
 63 Id. para. 21. See also Daniel Saperstein, Note,  The European Counterterrorist As the 
Next U.S. Cold Warrior: Why the United States Should Select from the German and British 
Models of Procedure, Evidence, and Oversight for National Security Wiretapping, 32 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1947, 1977 (2009). 
 64 Klass, App. No. 58243/00, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 19. 
 65 Id. para. 21.  The chairman of the G10 Commission was required to be someone 
“qualified to hold judicial office.” Id. 
 66 Id. para. 21.  
 67 Id. para. 10. 
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and his correspondence.”68  The second paragraph qualifies this right by 
stipulating that “[t]here shall be no interference by a public authority with the 
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests [inter alia] of national 
security . . . [or] for the prevention of disorder or crime . . . .”69 
The plaintiffs in Klass argued that the G10 statute violated Article 8 for 
two reasons: first, they objected to the fact that in national security cases, the 
G10 eliminated judicial pre-approval of wiretapping and substituted a system 
of executive or ministerial warrants.70  Second, they contended that the law 
violated Article 8 because it permitted the government to conduct covert 
surveillance of persons deemed to constitute a threat to national security 
“without obliging the authorities in every case to notify the persons 
concerned after the event.”71 
2.  The Road to Strasbourg: Intervening Developments 
The Klass case reached the ECtHR in 1978.  Prior to reaching the court, 
however, two important developments occurred.  First, the German Federal 
Constitutional Court examined the validity of the G10 statute under the 
German Constitution and reached two main conclusions.72  First, the German 
court upheld the constitutional validity of executive or ministerial warrants in 
conjunction with ex post review of the lawfulness of ministers’ decisions by 
the G10 Commission.73  Second, however, the court stopped short of 
endorsing the constitutional validity of the G10 as a whole.  The court 
                                                                                                                   
 68 ECHR, supra note 9, art. 8(1).  
 69 Id. art. 8(2).  
 70 Klass, App. No. 58243/00, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 10.  
 71 Id.  The plaintiffs in Klass were not required to allege that they had in fact been 
wiretapped because, by American standards, standing requirements in Article 8 cases 
involving covert surveillance are effectively eliminated.  The ECtHR decided the standing 
issue by “accept[ing] that an individual may, under certain conditions, claim to be the victim 
of a violation [of his or her Article 8 rights] occasioned by the mere existence . . . of 
legislation permitting secret measures, without having to allege that such measures were in 
fact applied to him.”  Id. para. 34 (emphasis in original). 
 72 Bundesgerichtschof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Dec. 15, 1970, 
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] 30 (1), 1970 (Ger.).  The case is known in translation as 
the “Monitoring Opinion” or the “Privacy of Communications Case.”  See Schwartz, supra 
note 60, at 773–77. 
 73 The court concluded that the Commission “provid[ed] as effective [control] of the 
surveillance as the judiciary provided for wiretaps sought under the authority of the criminal 
law.”  Schwartz, supra note 60, at 775 (citing 30 BVerfGE, 1 (23) (Ger.)). 
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concluded that section 5(5) of the law, which mandated a blanket ban on 
post-surveillance notification of targeted persons, was incompatible with the 
German Constitution because it prohibited “informing the affected party 
about the restrictive measures [even] when it can occur without endangering 
the goal of the restriction.”74 
The second development that antedated the ECtHR’s decision in Klass 
was a substantial expansion of the de facto role of the G10 Commission.  In 
the G10 statute as written, the Commission was confined to conducting a 
once-a-month ex post review of ministers’ wiretap orders.75  After 1970, 
however, “apparently responsive to political considerations, [federal Interior 
Ministers adopted] a policy of presenting applications [for surveillance 
orders] to the G-10 Commission for prior review and approval.”76 
The G10 statute as written also prescribed that none of the targets of 
national security surveillance was entitled to post-surveillance notification.77  
The German Constitutional Court in its 1970 “Monitoring Opinion” had 
decided that post-surveillance notification was sometimes required, but it had 
not delineated “when notice would be required, or who (i.e., the G-10 
Commission or the Interior Minister) was to decide whether notice was to be 
provided.”78  In the wake of the Federal Constitutional Court’s decision, 
however, ministers began the practice of submitting to the G10 Commission 
their decisions to withhold notification, and the Commission assumed de 
facto power to “direct the Minister to inform the person concerned that he 
has been subjected to surveillance measures.”79  Therefore by 1978, the 
ECtHR was not only conscious of the greatly expanded role of the G10 
Commission, but was also aware that the German government intended to 
formalize the Commission’s role in proposed amendments to the G10 
statute.80 
In sum, between 1968 and 1978 two main events occurred.  First, the 
Federal Constitutional Court issued its 1970 decision requiring post-
surveillance notification of some but not all targets of national security 
                                                                                                                   
 74 Id. at 776 (quoting BVerfGE, 30 (32) (Ger.)).  See also Klass, App. No. 58243/00, 28 
Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 11. 
 75 Klass, App. No. 58243/00, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 21. 
 76 Carr, supra note 59, at 622. 
 77 Klass, App. No. 58243/00, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 10. 
 78 Carr, supra note 59, at 613.  
 79 Klass, App. No. 58243/00, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 19. 
 80 Id. para. 21.  The amendments were enacted on September 13, 1978, one week after the 
Klass decision was handed down.  Carr, supra note 59, at 613 n.50. 
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surveillance.81  Second, the G10 Commission assumed de facto power both 
to pre-approve ministers’ decisions to initiate surveillance and to withhold 
post-surveillance notification.82  These developments presumably made the 
ECtHR’s task of deciding whether the G10 statute was compatible with 
Article 8 of the ECHR considerably easier than it might otherwise have been.   
3.  Klass v. Germany 
The ECtHR began its assessment by asserting—in a passage that is 
reiterated without fail in all of its post-Klass surveillance decisions—that the 
court “must be satisfied that, whatever system of surveillance is adopted, 
there exist adequate and effective guarantees against abuse.”83  It then noted 
that in the area of executive branch electronic surveillance, “it is in principle 
desirable to entrust supervisory control to a judge.”84  However, the court 
concluded that the G10 Board and the G10 Commission “are independent of 
the authorities carrying out the surveillance, and are vested with sufficient 
powers and competence to exercise an effective and continuous control.”85  It 
followed, in the court’s view, that “the exclusion of judicial control does not 
exceed the limits of what may be deemed necessary in a democratic 
society.”86 
On the post-surveillance notification issue, the ECtHR expressed 
skepticism that it was “feasible in practice to require subsequent notification 
in all cases.”87  It chose instead to endorse the compromise adopted by the 
Federal Constitutional Court, that is, to require post-surveillance notification 
“as soon as notification can be made without jeopardising the purpose of the 
restriction.”88  The ECtHR then reached its final conclusion that “the German 
legislature was justified to consider the interference resulting from [the G10 
statute] with the exercise of the right guaranteed by Article 8(1) as being 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security and for 
the prevention of disorder or crime (Art. 8(2)).”89 
                                                                                                                   
 81 See supra notes 74, 77–79 and accompanying text. 
 82 Klass, App. No. 58243/00, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. paras. 19, 21 
 83 Id. para. 50. 
 84 Id. para. 56. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. para. 58. 
 88 Id.  
 89 Id. para. 60. 
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4.  Conclusion 
Klass achieved a variety of objectives.  First, the decision signaled that 
written legislation authorizing and regulating the exercise of interception of 
communications by executive branch officials was desirable, and perhaps 
even imperative.  Second, it adopted a generous approach to standing, 
whereby an individual could challenge existing surveillance legislation 
“without having to allege that such measures were in fact applied to him.”90  
Third, it held that in the context of intelligence gathering and the protection 
of national security, mechanisms for overseeing executive branch electronic 
surveillance other than pre-approval by courts were permissible, provided 
they incorporated “adequate and effective guarantees against abuse.”91 
Finally, Klass suggested that in national security cases, a blanket 
prohibition on notification of targeted persons would violate the ECHR.  
However, by the time the case reached the ECtHR, the G10’s blanket 
prohibition had been preemptively excised from the law by the Federal 
Constitutional Court, which required selective post-surveillance notification 
as a matter of domestic German constitutional law.92  Thus, it cannot be said 
that Klass precluded the possibility that a blanket ban on post-surveillance 
notification in national security cases would be consistent with the ECHR. 
In addition, Klass necessarily failed to address the role of Article 8 in 
placing constraints on the power of government to engage in interception of 
communications in ordinary criminal cases.  In particular, the decision left 
open two questions.  The first was whether a system that excluded courts 
from playing any role in pre-approving law enforcement officials’ 
interception decisions would violate the ECHR.  The second was whether, in 
ordinary criminal cases, the ECHR would permit a selective ban, let alone a 
blanket ban, on post-surveillance notification of targeted persons.  A brewing 
challenge to British arrangements for interception of communications by 
executive branch officials in both national security investigations and 
ordinary criminal cases provided a vehicle for the ECtHR to scrutinize these 
important issues. 
                                                                                                                   
 90 Id. para. 34; see also supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 91 Klass, App. No. 58243/00, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 50. 
 92 See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
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III.  INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
The interplay of judicial and legislative decisions that led eventually to 
the ECtHR’s 2010 opinion in Kennedy v. United Kingdom took three full 
decades to unfold. From 1979–1985, an initial round of developments 
occurred that focused on the issue of telephone tapping in criminal cases.  
This culminated in the passage of the Interception of Communications Act 
1985.  In the ensuing fifteen years, British policy makers struggled to 
respond to the ECtHR’s insistence on greater statutory regulation of the 
security services and of forms of covert surveillance other than wiretapping.  
In 2000, Parliament brought some closure to the events of this period by 
enacting the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act. 
A.  Initial Developments, 1979–1985 
The Klass decision was handed down on September 6, 1978.  Only a few 
weeks earlier, an antiques dealer named James Malone had been on trial in 
London for the offense of handling stolen property.93  During the trial, it was 
revealed that Malone’s telephone had been tapped and that the police had 
intercepted at least one conversation.94  The trial ended partially in acquittal 
and partially in a mistrial, whereupon Malone instituted civil proceedings 
against the Metropolitan Police Commissioner in the Chancery Division of 
the High Court.95  The relief he sought was a declaration that the Police 
Commissioner had acted unlawfully by tapping Malone’s telephone, even 
though all parties to the litigation conceded that the tapping had been done 
pursuant to a warrant issued by the Home Secretary.96  Malone’s civil suit 
culminated, within Britain, with the issuance of a judgment by Vice-
Chancellor Robert Megarry, Chief Judge of the Chancery Division of the 
High Court.97 
The Malone litigation brought to light a substantial array of obscure 
details about the practice of wiretapping in Britain.  The information had 
been published in a 1957 report of the Committee of Privy Councillors 
                                                                                                                   
 93 Simon Chesterman, “Ordinary Citizens” or A License to Kill? The Turn to Law in 
Regulating Britain’s Intelligence Services, 29 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 2 (2011). 
 94 Id. 
 95 Malone v. Comm’r of Police of the Metropolis (No. 2), [1979] 2 All E.R. 620 (Ch.). 
 96 Id. 
 97 For further discussion of the background of the Malone case and the decision of the High 
Court, see infra in notes 118–41 and accompanying text. 
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(Birkett Report).98  The Birkett Report may have been widely read at the time 
it was issued, but by the late 1970s its notoriety had faded.  As a result, when 
its contents were disseminated anew in connection with the Malone decision, 
they came as a revelation to many. 
1.  The Birkett Report (1957) 
The mandate of the Birkett Committee was to “report upon the exercise 
by the Secretary of State of the executive power to intercept 
communications.”99  In 1957, the post office was responsible for operating 
both the postal system and the telephone system.100  Thus, the Birkett 
Committee was charged with examining the role of the executive, in 
conjunction with the post office, in the interception of both postal and 
telephone communications.101 
With respect to the interception of postal communications, the Committee 
reported that statutes in force since 1710 forbid postal employees from 
opening mail except when authorized to do so “in obedience to an express 
warrant in writing under the hand of a Secretary of State.”102  With respect to 
telephone communications, the Committee discovered that the post office 
was likewise responsible for responding to government requests to engage in 
wiretapping—from both the police and the Security Service (MI5)—and that 
it had been doing so “from time to time since the introduction of the 
telephone.”103 
There was one important difference, however, between the power of the 
post office to open mail, on the one hand, and to tap telephones, on the other: 
the power to tap telephones had no statutory foundation.104  No provision of 
the Post Office Act 1953 or of any other parliamentary legislation expressly 
authorized the government to engage in telephone tapping, with or without a 
                                                                                                                   
 98 COMMITTEE OF PRIVY COUNCILLORS, INQUIRY INTO THE INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS, 
BIRKETT REPORT, 1957, Cmnd. 283 (U.K.) [hereinafter BIRKETT REPORT], available at http:// 
www.fipr.org/rip/Birkett.htm.  The Committee was chaired by Lord Norman Birkett and thus 
bears his name. 
 99 Id. ¶ 1. 
 100 Id. ¶ 40. 
 101 Id. ¶ 39.  
 102 Id. ¶ 33 (quoting Post Office Act 1953, 1 & 2 Eliz. II, c. 36, §58(1) (U.K.), at the time the 
most recent version of the statute of 1710). 
 103 Id. ¶ 40. 
 104 Id. ¶ 27. 
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warrant issued by the Secretary of State.105  Consequently, the Committee 
reported that until 1937 “[n]o warrants by the Secretary of State were 
therefore issued.”106 
The Birkett Committee also learned, however, that in 1937 the 
government had decided that interception of telephone communications, like 
interception of postal communications, should be conditioned on a warrant 
issued by the Secretary of State for the Home Department.107  The decision 
extended the system of “executive” or “ministerial” warrants—that is, those 
issued by the Home Secretary, rather than a judge—to cover telephone 
tapping as well as the opening of mail.108  The extension was effected not by 
the passage of legislation, however, but by administrative fiat.  Thus, the 
interception of telephone communications continued to lack any express 
statutory foundation.109 
The Birkett Committee then turned to the actual practice of wiretapping 
by government officials.  It determined that the Home Secretary relied on 
established but unpublished criteria when deciding whether to issue a 
warrant.110  Three criteria governed the issuance of warrants to investigate 
ordinary criminal activity: 
(a) The offence must be really serious.111 
(b) Normal methods of investigation must have been tried and 
failed [or] be unlikely to succeed if tried. 
(c) There must be good reason to think that an interception 
would result in a conviction.112 
The Birkett Committee also examined the government’s use of telephone 
tapping to protect against threats to national security.  The Committee 
determined that the Security Service (MI5) was responsible for wiretapping 
in such cases, and that it did so pursuant to a warrant issued by the Home 
Secretary.  The Committee also learned that the criterion on which the 
                                                                                                                   
 105 Id. ¶ 40. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. ¶ 41. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. ¶¶ 41–52. 
 110 Id.¶ 64. 
 111 A “really serious” offense was defined as one that was punishable by three years’ 
imprisonment, or was an offense “of lesser gravity in which a large number of people were 
involved.”  Id. ¶ 65. 
 112 Id. ¶ 64. 
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Secretary of State based decisions to issue a warrant was that “[t]here must 
be a major subversive or espionage activity that is likely to injure the 
national interest.”113 
A final important finding of the Birkett Committee concerned the use to 
which the evidence produced by a wiretap was put.  The Committee reported 
that it was the unvarying practice of the Home Office not only to refrain 
from notifying persons who had been the targets of a wiretap, even in 
criminal cases, but also to scrupulously avoid using wiretap evidence in 
criminal prosecutions, and to respond to all inquiries by refusing to confirm 
or deny that telephone tapping had occurred at all.114 
The Birkett Committee then offered two broad conclusions.  First, it 
noted that it has “been urged in some quarters that the authority for the issue 
of warrants for interception should not be left exclusively in the hands of the 
Secretary of State” and that the “chief suggested alternatives . . . are that the 
Home Secretary should be assisted by an Advisory Committee or that 
warrants should be issued only on a sworn information before magistrates or 
a High Court judge.”115  The Committee responded that in its opinion, 
neither of these proposals would improve matters.  If a number 
of magistrates or judges had the power to issue such warrants, 
the control of the use to which methods of interception can be 
put would be weaker than under the present system.  It might 
well prove easier in practice to obtain warrants.116 
The Committee’s second and overall conclusion was that it was  
satisfied that all the officers and officials concerned are 
scrupulous and conscientious in the use and exercise of the 
power to intercept communications.  We are satisfied that 
interception is highly selective and that it is used only where 
                                                                                                                   
 113 Id. ¶ 67. 
 114 Id. ¶ 152.  The Home Office policy of never relying on wiretap evidence in individual 
cases has often been questioned but has never been abandoned.  The most recent reaffirmation 
of the policy is the report of a cross-party group of Privy Counselors chaired by Sir John 
Chilcot.  See SEC’Y OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEP’T, INTERCEPT AS EVIDENCE, 2014, Cm. 8989 
(U.K.), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_da 
ta/file/388111/InterceptAsEvidence.pdf; see also infra notes 183–85 and accompanying text. 
 115 BIRKETT REPORT, supra note 98, ¶ 85. 
 116 Id. ¶ 86. 
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there is good reason to believe that a serious offence or security 
interest is involved.117 
2.  Malone v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis 
The 1957 Birkett Report continued to accurately describe the practice of 
telephone tapping in Britain in 1979, when the High Court decided James 
Malone’s civil suit against the Metropolitan Police Commissioner.118  The 
litigation arose when, in the course of Malone’s 1978 criminal prosecution 
for handling stolen property, a police sergeant inadvertently provided the 
court with notes of a 1977 telephone conversation between Malone and 
another.119  In doing so, of course, the sergeant had breached the long-
standing policy of the Home Office against courtroom disclosure of intercept 
evidence.120  However, his misstep obliged the government to admit that in 
accordance with policy—that is, on the authority of a warrant signed by the 
Secretary of State—an interception had occurred.121  The trial ended 
inconclusively, and while awaiting re-trial, Malone filed his suit in the High 
Court.122 
The lawsuit consisted of three main claims.  First, Malone argued that 
there was at common law a “right of privacy” that made it “unlawful for 
anyone,” including the post office on the authority of a warrant issued by the 
Secretary of State, “to intercept or monitor the telephone conversations of 
another without the consent of that other.”123  Second, Malone argued that 
telephone tapping as practiced in the United Kingdom violated Article 8 of 
the ECHR “as construed by the European Court [in the Klass case].”124  
Finally, Malone argued that telephone tapping as practiced in the United 
Kingdom was unlawful because it was not based on “any grant of powers to 
the executive to tap telephones, either by statute or by the common law.”125 
                                                                                                                   
 117 Id. ¶ 123. 
 118 Malone, 2 All E. R. 620; see also supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text. 
 119 Malone, 2 All E. R. at 624. 
 120 See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 121 Malone, 2 All E. R. at 624. 
 122 Id. at 623–24. 
 123 Id. at 630. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
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3.  The Decision in Malone 
In the end, Vice-Chancellor Megarry dismissed all of Malone’s claims.  
In the course of a long and thoughtful judgment, however, he conscientiously 
addressed each of the plaintiff’s arguments.  Malone’s first claim was that 
while the English common law might not recognize a general right of 
privacy, it did at least recognize “a particular right of privacy . . . to hold a 
telephone conversation in the privacy of one’s home without molestation.”126  
To support this claim, Malone relied on the famous English general warrant 
cases, including Entick v. Carrington, and on the Fourth Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution.   
In Entick v. Carrington,127 Lord Camden had examined the legality of a 
search of Entick’s home for seditious literature under a general warrant 
issued by the Secretary of State, Lord Halifax.128  Camden concluded that in 
the absence of a clear common law or statutory basis for the exercise by the 
Secretary of State of the power to issue the warrant, the resulting search was 
an illegal trespass.129  Vice-Chancellor Megarry concluded, however, that 
Malone could not obtain “any assistance . . . from the general warrant 
cases.”130  Despite conceding that “there is admittedly no statute which in 
terms authorises the tapping of telephones, with or without a warrant,” 
Megarry found that  
any conclusion that the tapping of telephones is therefore 
illegal would plainly be superficial in the extreme.  The reason 
why a search of premises which is not authorised by law is 
illegal is that it involves the tort of trespass to those premises: 
and any trespass, whether to land or goods or the person, that is 
made without legal authority is prima facie illegal.  Telephone 
tapping by the Post Office, on the other hand, involves no act 
                                                                                                                   
 126 Id. at 631. 
 127 (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.) 807. 
 128 Nathan Carrington was the most senior of the “King’s Messengers,” four of whom had 
conducted the search of Entick’s premises and been sued for trespass in the Court of Common 
Pleas.  Id. at 807–08. 
 129 Id. at 818. 
 130 Malone, 2 All E. R. at 640. 
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of trespass. . . .  [A]ll that is done is done within the Post 
Office’s own domain.131 
Vice-Chancellor Megarry was also unwilling to accept Malone’s 
Fourth Amendment-based argument in support of the existence of an 
English common law right of telephone privacy.  He acknowledged that 
the Fourth Amendment was “mainly based on the English cases on 
general warrants, especially Entick v. Carrington.”132  He also recognized 
that in Katz v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court had “rejected 
previous authority which held that the Fourth Amendment was not 
violated by telephone tapping which was effected without any act of 
trespass or any seizure of any material object.”133  Nevertheless, he 
insisted that “[t]hough mainly based on the English cases on general 
warrants, the Fourth Amendment goes far beyond anything to be found in 
those cases; and Katz is explicitly based on the Fourth Amendment.”134  
He concluded, therefore, that he did not think that “either the Fourth 
Amendment or the [Katz] decision gives any real assistance to counsel’s 
contentions for the plaintiff about the law of England.”135 
Megarry was also unconvinced by Malone’s argument that Article 8 of 
the ECHR conferred “direct rights” on U.K. citizens, or at least that it 
should guide domestic courts in the task of interpreting and applying 
English law.  He held—and on this question he was clearly right at the 
time—that the Convention “[did] not, as a matter of English law, confer 
any direct rights on the plaintiff that he can enforce in the English 
courts.”136  On use of the ECHR to assist the court in identifying the 
content of English law, Megarry conceded that “if the question before me 
were one of construing a statute enacted with the purpose of giving effect 
to obligations imposed by the convention, the court would readily seek to 
construe the legislation in a way that would effectuate the convention 
                                                                                                                   
 131 Id.  Megarry’s reasoning is of course strikingly reminiscent of that expressed by Chief 
Justice Taft’s majority opinion in Olmstead v. United States.  See supra notes 16–19 and 
accompanying text. 
 132 Malone, 2 All E. R. at 631 (quoting 8 HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND ¶ 843 (4th ed. 
2004)). 
 133 Id. at 632. 
 134 Id. at 644. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. at 647. 
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rather than frustrate it.”137  However, Megarry found, “no relevant 
legislation of that sort is in existence,” and where Parliament has 
abstained from legislating on a point that is plainly suitable for 
legislation, it is indeed difficult for the court to lay down new rules of 
common law or equity that will carry out the Crown’s treaty obligations, 
or to discover for the first time that such rules have always existed.138 
Megarry concluded by revisiting the question of whether the absence 
of statutory controls, as such, rendered the practice of telephone tapping 
in Britain unlawful.  He alluded to the fact that earlier in his opinion he 
had held that 
[i]f the tapping of telephones by the Post Office at the 
request of the police can be carried out without any breach 
of the law, it does not require any statutory or common law 
power to justify it: it can lawfully be done simply because 
there is nothing to make it unlawful.139 
He concluded that now that he had “held that . . . tapping can indeed 
be carried out without committing any breach of the law, the contention 
[that the absence of any grant of powers to the executive renders 
telephone tapping unlawful] necessarily fails.”140 
  
                                                                                                                   
 137 Id. at 647–48. 
 138 Id. at 648.  Here—and earlier at pp. 635–38—Megarry devoted considerable attention 
to the ECHR, to the G10 statute, and to the ECtHR’s decision in the Klass case.  He noted 
that “[n]ot a single one of [the] safeguards [contained in the G10 statute] is to be found as a 
matter of established law in England,” and that “it is impossible to read the judgment in the 
Klass case without it becoming abundantly clear that a system which has no legal 
safeguards whatever has small chance of satisfying the requirements of [the ECtHR].”  Id.  
He then remarked that the absence of statutory safeguards rendered telephone tapping “a 
subject which cries out for legislation.”  Id. at 649. 
 139 Id. at 638. 
 140 Id. at 649. 
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4.  The Aftermath of Malone 
In response to Vice-Chancellor Megarry’s judgment in Malone, the Home 
Secretary addressed Parliament.141  He stated that the government had 
considered “with great care” Vice-Chancellor Megarry’s suggestion that the 
use of interception should be governed by legislation.142  However, he went 
on to say that in the view of the government the interception of 
communications 
is, by definition, a practice that depends for its effectiveness 
and value upon being carried out in secret, and cannot therefore 
be subject to the normal processes of parliamentary control.  Its 
acceptability in a democratic society depends on its being 
subject to ministerial control, and on the readiness of the public 
and their representatives in Parliament to repose their trust in 
the Ministers concerned to exercise that control 
responsibly. . . .  The Government have come to the clear 
conclusion that [existing] procedures, conditions and 
safeguards [are] a good and sufficient protection for the liberty 
of the subject, and would not be made significantly more 
effective for that purpose by being embodied in legislation.  
The Government have accordingly decided not to introduce 
legislation on these matters.143 
Malone responded to his defeat in the High Court by submitting an 
application to the European Commission of Human Rights.144  On December 
17, 1982, the Commission declined to assess the merits of Britain’s non-
statutory arrangements for authorization and oversight of wiretapping and 
held instead that the British system failed to satisfy the “threshold” 
                                                                                                                   
 141 982 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1980) 205–20 (U.K.) (remarks of Secretary of State for 
the Home Department William Whitelaw). 
 142 Id. col. 207. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Prior to 1998, applications alleging a violation of rights protected by the ECHR were 
initially submitted to the European Commission, a body consisting of lawyers but not 
necessarily judges.  An applicant could not appeal an adverse decision of the Commission, but 
the Commission itself could refer a case to the ECtHR (and could do so irrespective of the 
direction of its decision).  In 1998, the Commission was abolished and applications are now 
submitted directly to the European Court.  See ECTHR, ECHR OVERVIEW: 1959–2015, at 10, 
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Overview_19592015_ENG.pdf. 
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requirement of Article 8(2) of the ECHR that any interference with privacy 
rights protected by Article 8(1) must be “in accordance with the law.”145 
5.  The European Court of Human Rights Decision 
On May 16, 1983, the European Commission referred the Malone case to 
the European Court of Human Rights.146  Like the European Commission, 
the ECtHR declined to assess the merits of Britain’s non-statutory 
interception regime, and held instead that it violated Article 8 because it was 
“not in accordance with the law.”147  At the same time, the court elected to 
use the case as a vehicle for setting forth substantial components of what 
would become an oft-repeated body of “black letter law” on secret 
surveillance.148 
The court first asserted what was obvious: that the ECHR required, at a 
minimum, that any national system of authorization and oversight of 
interception of communications “must have some basis in domestic law.”149  
It promptly stiffened this basic requirement, however, by articulating two 
additional features that it would henceforth regard as essential for purposes 
of assessing interception legislation.  “Firstly,” the court said, 
the law must be adequately accessible: the citizen must be able 
to have an indication that is adequate in the circumstances of 
the legal rules applicable to a given case.  Secondly, a norm 
cannot be regarded as “law” unless it is formulated with 
sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his 
conduct: he must be able—if need be with appropriate 
advice—to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the 
circumstances, the consequences which a given action may 
entail.150 
                                                                                                                   
 145 Malone v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8691/79, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. 385, paras. 118–145 
(Eur. Com. H.R., 1982).  See also supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text.  
 146 Malone v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8691/79, 82 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1984), 
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57533. 
 147 Id. paras. 66–80. 
 148 See, e.g., Kennedy v. United Kingdom, App. No. 26839/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. paras. 151–153 
(2010), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.itn/eng?i=001-98473. 
 149 Malone, App. No. 8691/79, 82 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 66. 
 150 Id. (quoting Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6538/74, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R (ser. 
A) para. 49 (1979), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57584; Silver v. United 
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The court conceded that “the requirement of foreseeability cannot mean 
that an individual should be enabled to foresee when the authorities are likely 
to intercept his communications so that he can adapt his conduct 
accordingly.”151  Nevertheless, the court said, 
the law must be sufficiently clear in its terms to give citizens an 
adequate indication as to the circumstances in which and the 
conditions on which public authorities are empowered to resort 
to this secret and potentially dangerous interference with the 
right to respect for private life and correspondence.152 
The court then wrapped up its articulation of the “general principles” 
relevant to deciding whether a government’s system of interception of 
communications would qualify as being “in accordance with the law.”  Since 
the implementation of measures of secret surveillance is “not open to 
scrutiny by the individuals concerned or the public at large,” the court held 
that 
it would be contrary to the rule of law for the legal discretion 
granted to the executive to be expressed in terms of an 
unfettered power.  Consequently, the law must indicate the 
scope of any such discretion conferred on the competent 
authorities and the manner of its exercise with sufficient 
clarity, having regard to the legitimate aim of the measure in 
question, to give the individual adequate protection against 
arbitrary interference.153 
When the foregoing principles were applied to the practice of telephone 
tapping in Britain, the outcome was predictable.154  The ECtHR concluded 
that in England and Wales the law 
                                                                                                                   
Kingdom, App. No. 5947/72, 1983 Eur. Ct. H.R. 5, paras. 87–88 (1983), available at http:// 
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57577.). 
 151 Malone, App. No. 8691/79, 82 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 67. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. para. 68. 
 154 Widespread belief that the ECtHR would condemn the practice of telephone tapping in 
Britain for failing to satisfy the requirement that any interference with privacy rights must be 
“in accordance with the law” dates at least from Vice-Chancellor Megarry’s 1979 decision in 
Malone.  See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
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does not indicate with reasonable clarity the scope and manner 
of exercise of the relevant discretion conferred on the public 
authorities.  To that extent, the minimum degree of legal 
protection to which citizens are entitled under the rule of law in 
a democratic society is lacking [and therefore] the interferences 
with the applicant’s right under Article 8 to respect for his 
private life and correspondence . . . were not “in accordance 
with the law.”155 
6.  Interception of Communications Act 1985 
The ECtHR’s decision in Malone finally prompted the British 
government to enact legislation.  However, what the court had decided in 
Malone was that the practice of interception of communications in Britain 
failed to satisfy the threshold requirement that any interference with Article 8 
privacy rights must be “in accordance with the law.” This decision was 
based, in turn, solely on the fact that existing arrangements for intercepting 
communications had not been embodied in a written law.156  The government 
decided to take advantage of the limited scope of the court’s decision by 
requesting that Parliament give statutory expression, albeit with some 
important modifications, to the status quo.157 
The Interception of Communications Act 1985 made it a crime to 
intentionally “intercept a communication in the course of its transmission by 
post or by means of a public telecommunication system.”158  However, a 
person was not guilty of an offense if “the communication is intercepted in 
obedience to a warrant issued by the Secretary of State.”159 
Section 2 of the Act then granted the Secretary of State the power to issue 
interception warrants.160  The Act prescribed that the Secretary of State “shall 
not issue a warrant . . . unless he considers that the warrant is necessary (a) in 
the interests of national security; (b) for the purpose of preventing or 
                                                                                                                   
   155 Malone, App. No. 8691/79, 82 Eur. Ct. H.R. paras. 79–80. 
 156 Id. paras. 66–80. 
 157 The legislation passed by Parliament—the Interception of Communications Act 1985—
was subsequently repealed and replaced by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. 
See Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, c. 1, §1-20 (U.K.) [hereinafter RIPA 2000].  
However, the interception provisions of RIPA 2000 largely replicate the 1985 Act.  See infra 
notes 229–32 and accompanying text. 
 158 Interception of Communications Act 1985, c. 56, § 1(1) (U.K.) [hereinafter ICA 1985]. 
 159 Id. § 1(2). 
 160 Id. § 2(1). 
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detecting serious crime; or (c) for the purpose of safeguarding the economic 
well-being of the United Kingdom.”161 
Requests for warrants to conduct internal or domestic wiretapping and 
other forms of covert surveillance originate primarily with the police and the 
Security Service (MI5) and are submitted for approval to the Secretary of 
State for the Home Department.162  According to the initial report of Lord 
Lloyd, the first Interception of Communications Commissioner, the basic 
procedure for the issuance of a warrant is that 
[w]hen an application arrives at the Home Office (I take the 
Home Office as typical) it is processed by the Warrants 
Unit . . . to ensure that the application is in order, and that the 
grounds put forward come within Section 2(2) of the Act.  If 
there is any doubt, the application is referred back.  If the 
application is approved . . . it is referred to the Permanent 
Under Secretary [and only then] is put before the Home 
Secretary for his personal approval.163 
The 1985 Act crafted two mechanisms, in addition to the warrant process 
itself, to oversee interception of communications by law enforcement and 
intelligence-gathering officials.  First, the Act established the position of 
Interception of Communications Commissioner and specified that the 
Commissioner would be appointed by the Prime Minister and would be “a 
person who holds or has held a high judicial office.”164  The three principal 
responsibilities of the Commissioner were (1) “to keep under review the 
carrying out by the Secretary of State of the functions conferred upon him by 
[the 1985 Act],”165 (2) to respond to requests for assistance from the 
                                                                                                                   
 161 Id. § 2(2). 
 162 Other secretaries of state—e.g., the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary—are 
also authorized to issue warrants.  In particular, requests from GCHQ to conduct external or 
strategic surveillance are ordinarily submitted to the Foreign Secretary.  See INTERCEPTION OF 
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSIONER, REPORT, 2011–12, H.C. 496, at 5, 16 (U.K.). 
 163 INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSIONER, REPORT, 1987, Cm. 108, ¶ 10, 
quoted in S.H. BAILEY ET AL., CIVIL LIBERTIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 574 (4th ed. 1995).  
For further discussion of the role of the Commissioner, see infra notes 164–68 and 
accompanying text.  For discussion of the internal (executive branch) procedures in electronic 
surveillance cases governed by Title III and FISA, see supra notes 25–26, 29–30, 46–47 and 
accompanying text. 
 164 ICA 1985, supra note 158, § 8(1). 
 165 Id. § 8(1)(a). 
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Interception of Communications Tribunal,166 and (3) to make an annual 
report to the Prime Minister.167 
Commissioners soon adopted two practices.  First, they began examining 
a random sample of warrants issued by the Secretary of State.  Second, they 
paid regular visits to the police, the intelligence services, and the other 
agencies authorized to apply to the Secretary of State for interception 
warrants.  The findings from these inspections and visits are presented in an 
annual report to the Prime Minister.168 
The second oversight mechanism established by the 1985 Act was the 
Interception of Communications Tribunal.  The tribunal was comprised of 
“five members each of whom shall be a barrister, advocate or solicitor of not 
less than ten years’ standing.”169 It was charged with investigating 
applications from “[a]ny person who believes that communications sent to or 
by him have been intercepted.”170  In fulfilling this task, the tribunal was 
instructed to investigate “whether there is or has been a relevant warrant,”171 
and, where such a warrant exists, to investigate “whether there has been any 
contravention of sections 2 to 5 [of the Act].”172 
The tribunal was next instructed that when it investigates a complaint, it 
should apply “the principles applicable by a court on an application for 
judicial review.”173  British courts at the time possessed the power of 
                                                                                                                   
 166 Id. § 8(1)(b).  For further discussion of the role of the tribunal, see infra notes 169–85 
and accompanying text. 
 167 ICA 1985, supra note 158, § 8(6).  The Commissioner’s responsibilities are today set 
forth in sections 57–64 of RIPA 2000. 
 168 See, e.g., INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSIONER, REPORT, 2009-10, H.C. 341, 
¶ 2.1 (U.K.), available at http://www.iocco-uk.info/docs/2009%20Annual%20Report.pdf. 
I have decided to continue with the practice followed by my predecessors of 
making twice yearly visits to the Security Service, the Secret Intelligence 
Service, Government Communications Headquarters, [various police 
agencies], the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Home Office, the 
Scottish Government and the Ministry of Defence. . . . Prior to each visit, I 
obtain a complete list of warrants issued or renewed . . . since my previous 
visit.  I then select, largely at random, a sample of warrants for 
inspection. . . . In the course of my visit I satisfy myself that those warrants 
fully meet the criteria of RIPA [and] that proper procedures have been 
followed. 
 169 ICA 1985, supra note 158, § 7, sch. 1(1). 
 170 Id. § 7(2).  The tribunal was authorized to decline to investigate any application 
“appearing to the Tribunal to be frivolous or vexatious.”  Id. § 7(3). 
 171 Id. § 7(3)(a). 
 172 Id. § 7(3)(b).  Sections 2 to 5 set forth in detail the process to be followed by the 
Secretary of State when issuing interception warrants. 
 173 Id. § 7(4). 
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“judicial review of administrative action,” that is, the power to declare ultra 
vires the decisions of executive and administrative officials on whom 
Parliament, by law, had conferred decision-making power.  There were 
numerous relatively specific grounds on which a court could overturn an 
official’s decision, but it was also theoretically possible to do so on the 
residual ground that the decision was “unreasonable.”   
In a case decided in 1947, however, Lord Greene of the Court of Appeal 
articulated a remarkably lenient definition of “unreasonable.”174  According 
to Lord Greene, a court could invalidate the decision of an executive or 
administrative official, but only if the court was convinced that the decision 
was “so unreasonable that no reasonable [decision maker] could ever have 
come to it.”175  Lord Greene’s definition gained wide acceptance and 
thereafter became known as “Wednesbury unreasonableness.”176 
In the context of interception of communications, the statutory instruction 
to apply “the principles applicable by a court on an application for judicial 
review” meant that the tribunal was prohibited from overturning the decision 
of the Secretary of State to issue an interception warrant unless it believed 
that the decision was “so unreasonable that no reasonable Secretary of State 
could ever have come to it.”177  In addition, as we have seen, the Act 
authorized the issuance of warrants to achieve three broadly defined sets of 
goals: to protect national security, to prevent or detect serious crime, and to 
safeguard the economic well-being of the United Kingdom.178  Finally, the 
Act conferred on the Secretary of State subjective discretion to issue a 
warrant whenever “he considers that the warrant is necessary” to achieve 
these goals.  The predictable result was that numerous commentators 
expressed serious doubts about the efficacy of the tribunal as a check on the 
Secretary of State’s exercise of executive power.179 
                                                                                                                   
 174 Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corp., [1948] 1 K.B. 223 (1947), 
available at http://bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/1947/1.html. 
 175 Id. at 234.  
 176 See generally G.L. Peiris, Wednesbury Unreasonableness: The Expanding Canvas, 46 
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 53 (1987). 
  177 See supra notes 173–75 and accompanying text. 
 178 See ICA 1985, supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
 179 By American standards, commentary on the ICA 1985 is sparse.  See, e.g., Ian Leigh, A 
Tappers’ Charter?, 1986 P.L. 8; Graham Zellick, Government Beyond Law, 1985 P.L. 283; 
Ian J. Lloyd, The Interception of Communications Act 1985, 49 M.L.R. 86 (1986); Iain 
Cameron, Telephone Tapping and the Interception of Communications Act 1985, 37 N.I.L.Q. 
126 (1986). 
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In fact, doubts about the degree to which the 1985 Act realistically 
addressed the problem of executive power to engage in telephone tapping 
went beyond skepticism about the tribunal’s ability to strictly scrutinize the 
Secretary of State’s decisions.  The Act instructed the tribunal that if it 
concluded that sections 2 to 5 of the Act had been contravened, it was to 
“give notice to the applicant” and to “make a report” to the Prime 
Minister.180  If, on the other hand, the tribunal were to “come to any [other] 
conclusion,” it was instructed to “give notice to the applicant stating that 
there has been no contravention of [sections 2 to 5 of the Act] in relation to a 
relevant warrant.”181  Such “notice,” of course, would not inform the 
applicant whether his communications had or had not been intercepted, only 
that, if they had been, the Secretary of State’s decision to issue a warrant had 
not, in the opinion of the tribunal, been “Wednesbury unreasonable.”  For 
any applicant other than one against whom the Secretary of State had grossly 
misused his statutory power, the trip to the tribunal was therefore both 
fruitless and uninformative.182 
To ensure, moreover, that the tribunal was the final stop for applicants 
believing themselves to be under surveillance, the 1985 Act prescribed that 
the tribunal’s decision “shall not be subject to appeal or liable to be 
questioned in any court.”183  This prohibition on judicial review of the 
tribunal’s decisions by an ordinary court was intended to insulate the 
decisions of the tribunal from further scrutiny unless an individual decision 
of the tribunal, or the modus operandi of the tribunal itself, was successfully 
challenged in the ECtHR. 
Finally, there was the question of whether someone whose 
communications had been intercepted could or would learn by any other 
means whether an interception had occurred.  On this issue, the 1985 Act 
                                                                                                                   
 180 ICA 1985, supra note 158, § 7(4). 
 181 Id. § 7(7). 
 182 After the passage of RIPA 2000, the Interception of Communications Tribunal was 
replaced by the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT).  RIPA now forbids the Secretary of State 
from issuing an interception warrant unless he believes not only that the warrant is 
“necessary,” but also that “the conduct authorized by the warrant is proportionate to what is 
sought to be achieved by that conduct.” RIPA 2000, supra note 157, § 5(2).  As a result, the 
IPT is now obliged to evaluate the Secretary of State’s decision on the basis of both its 
“necessity” and its “proportionality,” rather than its mere avoidance of “Wednesbury 
unreasonableness.”  See infra note 230 and accompanying text.  That said, the IPT remains 
“confined” to giving notice to a complainant either that it has “made a determination in his 
favour [or] that no determination has been made in his favour.”  RIPA 2000, supra note 157, 
§ 68(4).  
 183 ICA 1985, supra note 158, § 7(8).  
2016]  JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT OF INTERPRETATION OF COMMUNICATIONS  275 
 
 
prescribed that “[i]n any proceedings before any court or tribunal”—apart 
from the Interception of Communications Tribunal itself, whose proceedings 
were ordinarily closed both to the applicant and to his or her legal 
representative—“no evidence shall be adduced and no question in cross-
examination shall be asked which . . . tends to suggest . . . that an offence 
[under section 1 of the Act] has been committed [e.g., by a government 
official, a police officer, or a public telecommunications operator] or . . . that 
a warrant has been or is to be issued to any of those persons.”184  Thus, the 
Act gave statutory force to the Home Office policy of refusing to rely on 
intercept evidence in judicial proceedings and refusing to confirm or deny 
whether interception had ever occurred.185 
7.  The Interception of Communications Act and Individual Rights 
From an American perspective, it is easy to see why civil libertarians and 
other commentators in the United Kingdom viewed the Interception of 
Communications Act 1985 with consternation and alarm.  The legislation 
constituted statutory recognition of the power of the state to engage in 
interception of postal and telephone communications.  However, it located 
the power to issue interception warrants exclusively in the person of the 
Secretary of State.  Moreover, it authorized the Secretary to issue warrants in 
three broad categories of circumstances whenever he considered it 
“necessary” to do so.  The Act conferred general oversight responsibility on 
a figure who was required to hold or have held “high judicial office” but who 
was appointed by, and reported to, the Prime Minister.  It established a 
tribunal consisting of senior members of the legal profession to which an 
individual who believed himself or herself to have been under surveillance 
could apply.  However, it authorized the tribunal to conduct its deliberations 
without the participation of the applicant or his or her legal representative.  
Moreover, it instructed the tribunal to reach conclusions about the legality of 
an interception warrant by asking itself whether the Secretary of State’s 
decision to issue the warrant had been one that was “so unreasonable that no 
reasonable Secretary of State could ever have come to it.”186  Finally, it 
instructed the tribunal to inform an applicant—either one whose 
                                                                                                                   
 184 ICA 1985, supra note 158, § 9(1). 
 185 See supra note 114 and accompanying text.  RIPA 2000 perpetuates the total exclusion of 
interception evidence from criminal trials and other public proceedings.  See RIPA 2000, 
supra note 157, § 17. 
 186 Cf. supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
276 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 44:237 
 
 
communications had not been intercepted or one whose communications had 
been intercepted, in the opinion of the tribunal, pursuant to a lawfully issued 
warrant—that there had been “no contravention” of the statutory provisions 
governing the issuance of warrants. 
In addition to the foregoing features, the 1985 Act contained other glaring 
departures from the widely held belief, at least among legal scholars and civil 
libertarians, that courts should play a key role in approving or at least in 
reviewing executive branch decisions to engage in interception of 
communications.  The Act endeavored to make the tribunal the exclusive 
forum in which citizens could challenge suspected governmental interception 
of postal or telephone communications by prescribing that decisions of the 
tribunal “shall not be subject to appeal or liable to be questioned in any 
court.”  In addition, the Act forbade any use of interception evidence in court 
or any reference in court to the fact that interception had occurred.  The 
obvious question that arose at the time of the Act’s passage was whether it 
could possibly satisfy the requirements of Article 8 of the ECHR.  The 
prevailing view, at the time, was that it could not.187 
B.  The Run-up to RIPA, 1985–2000 
Parliament’s decision to go no further than to give statutory expression to 
the status quo was regarded by many as an inadequate response to the 
ECtHR’s insistence that the British government adopt legislation to govern 
the use of wiretapping.  In addition, it was widely recognized that forms of 
covert surveillance other than wiretapping continued to be exempt from 
statutory regulation.  Lastly, none of Britain’s principal intelligence 
agencies—the Security Service (MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), 
and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)—were subject 
to statutory control.  Predictably, political pressure began to build within 
Britain to eliminate these glaring gaps in the coverage of the written law. 
                                                                                                                   
 187 See, e.g., Leigh, supra note 179, at 18 (noting “there is nothing in the [1985] Act which 
gives any cause to believe that the rights of the individual have been significantly safeguarded 
against arbitrary interference by the State.”); Zellick, supra note 179, at 308 (arguing portions 
of the 1985 Act demonstrate the British government “is not fully subject to the law”); 
Cameron, supra note 179, at 149 (arguing the 1985 Act is at most a “minimalist interpretation 
of the United Kingdom’s obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights”); 
Lloyd, supra note 179, at 94 (noting “it may be doubted” whether the provisions of the 1985 
Act meet the requirements of the ECHR).  See also infra notes 215–23, 234–72 and 
accompanying text. 
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1.  National Security, Telephone Tapping, and the Massiter Revelations 
The Security Service (MI5) was founded in 1909 and is responsible today 
for responding, within Britain, to domestic and foreign threats to national 
security.188  In 1937, the government determined that the Security Service, 
along with the police, should secure a warrant from the Secretary of State for 
the Home Department before engaging in wiretapping.189  The criteria for 
issuance of a warrant were first published in the Birkett Report, and they 
included the stipulation that the Secretary of State should not issue a warrant 
to the Security Service unless there is “a major subversive, terrorist or 
espionage activity that is likely to injure the national interest.”190 
Catherine Massiter worked in MI5 from 1981 to 1983.191  In 1985, she 
went public with a set of damning allegations about the way the non-
statutory warrant-granting process in national security cases functioned 
during her employment with the agency.  In particular, Massiter made three 
specific claims, each of which was based on her personal knowledge: first, 
she alleged that the Secretary of State had issued a warrant of questionable 
legality to wiretap the telephone of John Cox, a long-time member of the 
British Communist Party who was also an official of the Campaign for 
Nuclear Disarmament, Britain’s leading anti-nuclear peace group.192  Second, 
she alleged that MI5 maintained files on Patricia Hewitt and Harriet Harman, 
two officials of the National Council for Civil Liberties, which at the time 
was Britain’s most prominent civil liberties group.193  Finally, she alleged 
that as a by-product of the wiretap on John Cox’s telephone, MI5 classified 
Hewitt and Harman as “communist sympathisers” and had included in their 
                                                                                                                   
 188 The Security Service acquired its enduring, if unofficial, title of “MI5” when, in 1916, 
the then seven-year-old Secret Service Bureau was incorporated into the new Directorate of 
Military Intelligence.  See CHRISTOPHER ANDREW, DEFEND THE REALM: THE AUTHORIZED 
HISTORY OF MI5, at 3–28 (2009). 
 189 See supra notes 107–13 and accompanying text. 
 190 BIRKETT REPORT, supra note 98, ¶ 67. 
 191 Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister in 1979.  Massiter’s employment with MI5 
thus coincided with the early years of the Thatcher Government. 
 192 Massiter’s allegation is detailed in affidavits provided to the High Court in a legal 
challenge to the Secretary of State’s decision to issue a warrant.  The case was brought by Cox 
and two other officials of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament with whom Cox spoke by 
phone on a regular basis.  R. v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, ex parte Ruddock, [1987] 2 
All E.R. 518 (Q.B.).  
 193 The National Council for Civil Liberties was founded in 1934.  In 1989, it changed its 
name to Liberty.  See Liberty Timeline, LIBERTY, http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/wh 
o-we-are/history/liberty-timeline. 
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files information about their personal lives, their political opinions, and their 
professional activities.194 
Based on Massiter’s allegations, John Cox and two colleagues requested 
judicial review in the High Court of the legality of the Secretary of State’s 
decision to issue an interception warrant.  Judge Taylor’s decision in the case 
was issued shortly after passage of the Interception of Communications Act 
1985.195  Taylor noted that the Act conferred jurisdiction to investigate 
complaints of unlawful wiretapping on the Interception of Communications 
Tribunal, and that the courts would “henceforth cease to have any 
supervisory or investigatory function in the field of interceptions.”196  
However, Taylor declined to accept the government’s argument that the 
present litigation was “merely academic.”197  Instead, he asserted that “[i]f 
wrongdoing were proved”—that is, if the Secretary of State had issued a 
warrant in contravention of the government’s non-statutory guidelines—“the 
court should [not] shrink from declaring [that fact].”198  The government 
adhered to its policy of neither confirming nor denying that wiretapping had 
occurred but submitted an affidavit assuring the court that “no warrant has 
been issued which has not complied [with the existing non-statutory criteria 
requiring the existence of a ‘major subversive activity’].”199  On the basis of 
the government’s assurance, and without holding any sort of hearing, Taylor 
concluded that the Secretary of State’s decision to issue a warrant had not 
been “Wednesbury unreasonable,” and that therefore “these applications 
must be refused.”200  
Three years later, the European Commission resolved Hewitt and 
Harman’s claim that the Security Service had improperly collected and 
retained information on their beliefs and activities.201  Since its inception, the 
Security Service had not been governed by parliamentary legislation.202  As a 
                                                                                                                   
 194 Massiter’s second and third allegations are recounted in Hewitt and Harman’s application 
to the European Commission on Human Rights.  See  Hewitt and Harman v. United Kingdom, 
App. No. 12175/86, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 657 (1989). 
 195 The legislation had taken effect on April 10, 1986. 
 196 Ruddock, supra note 192, at 528. 
 197 Id. 
 198 Id.   
 199 Id. at 524.  See supra note 112 and accompanying text.  
 200 Ruddock, supra note 192, at 534–35.   
 201 Hewitt & Harman, App. No. 12175/86, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 657 (1989). 
 202 The mandate of the Security Service was contained in a six-paragraph Directive issued in 
1952 by the Home Secretary, Sir David Maxwell-Fife, to the Director-General of the Service.  
See Hewitt & Harman, App. No. 12175/86, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 661; LUSTGARTEN & LEIGH, 
supra note 11, at 517. 
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result, the Commission held that the interference with the applicants’ rights 
under Article 8(1) “was not ‘in accordance with the law’ as required by 
Article 8(2),” and that therefore the United Kingdom was in breach of its 
obligations under the ECHR.203 
2.  The Security Service Act 1989 and the Intelligence Services Act 1994 
In a resolution adopted in the wake of the European Commission’s 
decision in Hewitt and Harman, the Committee of Ministers of the Council 
of Europe noted that it had been “informed by the Government of the United 
Kingdom that the Security Service Act 1989 came into force on 18 
December 1989.”204  To satisfy the ECHR’s requirement that any 
interference with rights must be “in accordance with the law,” the Security 
Service Act placed the Security Service on a statutory footing, subject to the 
authority of the Secretary of State for the Home Department.205  In addition, 
following the template introduced by the Interception of Communications 
Act 1985, the Act created a Security Service Commissioner and a Security 
Service Tribunal.206 
The Security Service Act 1989 did not change the status quo with regard 
to wiretapping.  Since 1937, the Security Service had been obliged to seek 
warrants from the Secretary of State before engaging in such surveillance, 
and this arrangement was placed on a statutory footing when Parliament 
passed the Interception of Communications Act in 1985.  The principal 
innovation of the 1989 Act was to establish a system whereby the Security 
Service was also obliged to seek warrants from the Secretary of State for 
“entry on or interference with property,”207 that is, for operations in which 
there was entry to property either to seize or photograph items or to install a 
listening device.208 
The transformation of the United Kingdom’s security and intelligence 
agencies was taken a step further with Parliament’s passage of the 
Intelligence Services Act 1994.  The Act placed Britain’s other two principal 
intelligence agencies—the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) and the 
                                                                                                                   
 203 Hewitt & Harman, App. No. 12175/86, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 666. 
 204 Id. at 668–69.  At the time, the Committee of Ministers was the body responsible for 
enforcing the decisions of the European Commission and the ECtHR. 
 205 Security Service Act 1989, c.5, § 1(1).  
 206 Id. §§ 4–5. 
 207 Id. § 3(1). 
 208 See LUSTGARTEN & LEIGH, supra note 11, at 72–79; ANDREW, supra note 188, at 753–68. 
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Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)—on a statutory 
footing.209  These agencies, like the Security Service, were made subject to 
the authority of the Secretary of State, from whom they were required to 
obtain a warrant before undertaking any “entry on or interference with 
property.”210  Pursuant to the Interception of Communications Act 1985, the 
agencies also remained obligated to seek a warrant from the Secretary of 
State before engaging in wiretapping. 
3.  The Labour Government and Policy Change 
The election of a Labour government headed by Tony Blair in 1997 
brought to a head a number of policy debates anchored in concerns about the 
United Kingdom’s embarrassing defeats in Strasbourg, and the haphazard 
process by which Parliament and the courts had been addressing the status of 
secret surveillance.211  The government responded by announcing its 
intention to introduce in Parliament not only a “Human Rights Act”—the 
purpose of which would be to “incorporate” the ECHR into British law—but 
also comprehensive legislation to govern the authorization and use by 
government officials of not only telephone wiretapping but also other forms 
of covert surveillance.212  In November 1998, Parliament passed the Human 
Rights Act, and scheduled it to take effect in October 2000.213  In February 
2000, Parliament began consideration of the Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act 2000, the government’s proposed comprehensive surveillance 
legislation.214 
As was customary, the government invited public feedback on the content 
of the new legislation.  Submissions were received from various sources, 
including pressure groups dedicated to the protection of civil liberties and 
human rights.  The response of the human rights organization Liberty was 
                                                                                                                   
 209 Intelligence Services Act 1994, c. 13, §§ 1, 3.  
 210 Id. §§ 5(1)–(2). 
 211 SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT, RIGHTS BROUGHT HOME:  THE HUMAN 
RIGHTS BILL, 1997, CM 3782 (U.K.), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/sys 
tem/uploads/attachment_data/file/263526/rights.pdf. 
 212 Nick Taylor, State Surveillance and the Right to Privacy, 1 SURVEILLANCE & SOCIETY 66 
(2002).   
 213 The Human Rights Act, EQUALITY & HUM. RTS. COMM’N (Sept. 15, 2015), http://www. 
equalityhumanrights.com/your-rights/human-rights/what-are-human-rights/human-rights-act. 
 214 BIG BROTHER WATCH, THE REGULATION OF INVESTIGATORY POWERS ACT (RIPA) 1 
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typical.  The group strenuously opposed retention of the system of executive 
warrants given statutory expression in the Interception of Communications 
Act 1985.215  Liberty pointed out that while RIPA represented “an 
improvement on the existing law,” it failed to recognize that “the case law of 
the European Convention on Human Rights emphasises that prior judicial 
sanction is the preferable safeguard for the citizen’s Article 8 privacy rights 
in the investigative context.”216 
4.  The RIPA Debate in Parliament 
Responsibility for defending the merits of RIPA in Parliament fell to the 
Home Secretary, Jack Straw.217  Early in the debate, Straw was asked by 
Simon Hughes, the chief spokesperson for the Liberal Democratic Party, 
whether he could explain “why . . . the opportunity [was] not taken to do 
what many democratic countries have done, and transfer the [power to 
authorise interception of communications] from politicians or officials to a 
judicial authority in the first instance?”218  In response, the Home Secretary 
made several points.  First, he assured Parliament that “[t]he powers that are 
exercised by the Secretary of State—certainly by me and, I believe, by every 
one of my predecessors—have been exercised very carefully.”219  Second, he 
argued that “the system is judicially supervised,” because the Interception of 
Communications Commissioner, who engages in ex post review of a random 
sample of the Secretary of State’s decisions to issue a warrant, “is someone 
of high judicial standing.”220  Finally, he argued that: 
If one looks at the practice in other countries, it does not 
necessarily follow that, just because a judicial warrant is 
required, there is a greater safeguard for the individual.  Indeed, 
I suggest that, in quite a number of other countries, the fact that 
a judicial warrant is required lessens the protection that is 
                                                                                                                   
 215 LIBERTY, REGULATION OF INVESTIGATORY POWERS BILL: SECOND READING BRIEFING, 
HOUSE OF LORDS (2000), available at https://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/sites/default/ 
files/may-2000-ripa.pdf. 
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offered to people because the judicial warrant acts as a fig leaf 
for people’s human rights, and not as a serious safeguard.221 
When the debate moved to the House of Lords, discussion of executive 
versus judicial pre-approval of interception warrants continued.  Addressing 
a specific set of amendments intended to locate the power to issue warrants 
in a judge, rather than the Secretary of State, the spokesperson for the Liberal 
Democratic Party, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, took a conciliatory tone.  He 
cautioned that he was not suggesting that “the Secretary of State is 
‘unfit’ . . . to undertake the task [of issuing interception warrants].”  
Nevertheless, he said, “a considerable body of informed opinion in the 
country now believes that this task would be better undertaken by a 
judge.”222  The government’s spokesperson, Lord Bach, replied that 
[t]he arguments put forward by those who advocate judicial 
involvement do not at the end of the day persuade the 
Government that that is the right course to take.  We maintain 
the view that authorising interception involves particularly 
sensitive decisions that are properly a matter for the 
executive. . . . 
 Of course, there is an important, vital place for judicial 
involvement.  That comes . . . in the independent judicial 
oversight provided by the commissioners and the tribunal, who 
are there to provide a remedy if the executive has acted outside 
its statutory powers.223 
As the debate drew to a close, the Liberal Democratic Party stood alone in 
opposing the government’s decision to retain in the hands of the Secretary of 
State the power to issue interception warrants.224  On July 26, 2000, RIPA 
was enacted.  Two days later it received the Royal Assent, and on October 2, 
in tandem with the Human Rights Act 1998, it took effect.225 
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 225 David Allen Green, Why RIPA Matters, NEW STATESMAN (Jan. 28, 2011), http://www. 
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5.  The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 
In RIPA 2000, Parliament fulfilled the Blair government’s promise to 
enact into law a comprehensive regime for the regulation of surveillance-
based investigatory powers.  RIPA perpetuated existing arrangements for the 
regulation of telephone tapping.  In addition, RIPA established rules for the 
acquisition and disclosure of “communications data” and incorporated 
previous legislation subjecting to statutory control “entry on or interference 
with property” by the security and intelligence agencies226 and the police.227  
Finally, the legislation prescribed rules for the use by various public agencies 
of additional types of “covert surveillance,” including “intrusive 
surveillance,” “directed surveillance,” and the deployment of “covert human 
intelligence sources.”228 
RIPA repealed the Interception of Communications Act 1985, and 
replaced it with fresh provisions governing the interception of postal and 
telephone communications.229  However, the interception provisions of RIPA 
were nearly identical to those of the earlier law, albeit with some potentially 
significant modifications.  First, in keeping with long-standing doctrine of 
the ECtHR, RIPA augmented the requirement that the Secretary of State 
shall not issue an interception warrant unless he believes it is “necessary” to 
do so with a requirement that he must also believe “that the conduct 
authorised by the warrant is proportionate to what is sought to be achieved 
by that conduct.”230  Second, the law mandated the promulgation of “Codes 
of Practice” designed to provide the police and intelligence agencies with 
practical guidance regarding “the exercise and performance of the powers 
and duties mentioned [in the Act].”231  Finally, RIPA created a single 
Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) to assume the duties of the Interception 
of Communications Tribunal, the Security Service Tribunal, and the 
Intelligence Services Tribunal.  The IPT was given jurisdiction “to 
investigate any event that you believe has taken place against you, your 
                                                                                                                   
  226 See Intelligence Services Act 1994, ¶ 5 (U.K.). 
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 228 For a detailed summary of the complex provisions of RIPA 2000, see INTERCEPTION OF 
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property or your communications, as long as it relates to the use of a covert 
technique by a public authority regulated under [RIPA 2000] or a wider 
human rights breach by the intelligence agencies.”232 
6.  Conclusion 
In the decade and a half after 1985, the legal landscape relating to the 
British government’s use of electronic surveillance and other investigatory 
powers was transformed.  By 1994, all three of the principal intelligence 
agencies—MI5, MI6, and GCHQ—had been placed on a statutory footing, 
and their power to engage in various forms of covert surveillance had been 
subjected to statutory control.  In 1997, Parliament enacted statutory 
provisions to govern police interference with property for the purpose of 
installing a listening device.233  In RIPA 2000, Parliament merged these and 
other earlier changes into a comprehensive statutory regime to govern the use 
of a broad spectrum of surveillance techniques by a variety of public bodies, 
including, but not limited to, the police and the intelligence agencies.  
Virtually every one of the foregoing statutory developments was 
prompted by a successful or pending challenge to the status quo on the part 
of litigants who had invoked the enforcement mechanisms of the ECtHR.  
The reactive nature of the legislative policies enacted between 1985 and 
2000 has fueled continuing skepticism among civil libertarians and other 
commentators about the merits of British surveillance arrangements.234  
There is dismay that the British government has not introduced a system of 
judicial pre-approval of interception of communications, at least in 
connection with ordinary criminal investigations.235  There is also alarm at 
the care with which the government has succeeded in engineering the 
exclusion of ordinary courts from any role in responding to citizens’ 
complaints.236  Finally, there is a lingering suspicion that the net effect of 
Parliament’s legislative responses to ECtHR decisions has been to diminish 
                                                                                                                   
 232 Functions-Jurisdiction, INVESTIGATORY POWERS TRIBUNAL (June 29, 2014), http://www. 
ipt-uk.com/section.aspx?pageid=3. 
 233 Police Act 1997, c. 50, § 93. 
 234 See supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
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rather than to enhance citizens’ rights.237  What is undeniable is that in a 
relatively brief fifteen year period Parliament succeeded in passing an 
impressive body of statutory law designed to shield Britain from further 
embarrassing losses in the ECtHR, and to respond, however grudgingly, to 
the requirement of Article 8(2) of the ECHR that any interference with 
Article 8(1) privacy rights must be both “in accordance with the law” and 
“necessary in a democratic society.” 
IV.  RIPA 2000 IN THE EUROPEAN COURT: THE KENNEDY CASE 
The passage of RIPA 2000 set the stage for a judgment by the ECtHR on 
whether the British approach to telephone wiretapping was compatible with 
Article 8 of the ECHR.  The case, Kennedy v. United Kingdom,238 originated 
a full twenty years earlier with an incident in which the applicant, Malcolm 
Kennedy, was arrested for drunkenness and shared an overnight jail cell with 
another man.  When the cellmate was found dead the next morning, Kennedy 
was charged with murder.  Although he alleged that the police were covering 
up their own responsibility for the death, Kennedy was eventually convicted 
of manslaughter.  Upon his release in 1996, he became convinced that he was 
the target of illegal telephone tapping by the police, and in 2001, he lodged a 
complaint with the Investigatory Powers Tribunal.  On January 17, 2005, the 
IPT notified Kennedy that “no determination had been made in his 
favour.”239  On July 12, 2005, Kennedy applied to the European Court of 
Human Rights. 
The ECtHR chose to use Kennedy’s complaint to address “the general 
compliance [with Article 8 of the ECHR] of the RIPA regime for internal 
communications.”240  The court was determined, in other words, not to 
decide whether the applicant’s telephone calls had actually been intercepted, 
                                                                                                                   
 237 See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, Anglo-American Privacy and Surveillance, 96 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1059, 1063 (2006) (“Beginning in the mid-1980s, the European Court began to 
raise objections to the lack of safeguards and statutory framework.  But each time the Court 
handed down a significant finding against the United Kingdom, the state responded [by] 
expanding executive surveillance authorities.” (emphasis in original)).  But see Laura K. 
Donohue, The Perilous Dialogue, 97 CAL. L. REV. 357, 383 (2009) (“Even recognizing the 
many limitations of [RIPA], the complex web of oversight mechanisms in the United 
Kingdom does offer some check on untrammeled executive power—protections that for the 
most part do not exist in the United States.”). 
 238 Kennedy v. United Kingdom, App. No. 26839/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-98473. 
 239 Id. para. 20. 
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and, if they had been, whether the interception was lawful.  Instead, it 
signaled its intention to assess the “facial validity” of the provisions of RIPA 
that govern the interception of non-international telephone and postal 
communications.  Incorporated in this assessment was the question of 
whether the procedures followed by the Investigatory Powers Tribunal in 
addressing individual complaints were compatible with Article 6 of the 
ECHR, which guarantees that “everyone is entitled to a fair and public 
hearing [by] an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”241 
A.  The Article 8 Complaint 
The ECtHR prefaced its assessment of the facial validity of RIPA by 
summarily rejecting the government’s argument that Kennedy lacked 
standing to bring the case.  According to the court, Kennedy could challenge 
RIPA because he had brought his complaint “on the basis of the very 
existence of measures permitting secret surveillance.”242 
The court then addressed various specific objections to the surveillance 
regime established by the Interception of Communications Act 1985 and 
perpetuated in RIPA 2000.  First, the court concluded that the terms 
“national security” and “serious crime”—the broad grounds on which the 
Secretary of State is authorized to base decisions to issue interception 
warrants—were sufficiently clear to satisfy the court’s “foreseeability” 
requirement.243  The court expressly held that interception legislation is not 
required “to set out exhaustively by name the specific offences which may 
give rise to interception.”244  In addition, the court upheld the Convention-
compatibility of RIPA’s provisions on the duration of interception warrants 
and on the procedures for “examining, using and storing data” and other 
components of the process of dealing with the product of an interception 
order.245 
In response to the absence of any mechanism in RIPA for judicial pre-
approval of surveillance requests—and in light of its own oft-repeated 
assertion that in the area of secret surveillance, “it is in principle desirable to 
                                                                                                                   
 241 ECHR, supra note 9, art. 6(1). 
 242 Kennedy, App. No. 26839/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 125.  The court’s approach to standing 
was first enunciated in its 1978 decision in Klass.  See Klass, App. No. 58243/00, 28 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. at para. 34.  See also supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 243 Kennedy, App. No. 26839/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 159.  See also supra notes 149–53 and 
accompanying text.  
 244 Kennedy, App. No. 26839/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 159.  
 245 Id. paras. 161–165. 
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entrust supervisory control to a judge”246—the ECtHR warmly endorsed the 
role of the Interception of Communications Commissioner.  The court 
described the Commissioner as a person who “holds or has held high judicial 
office,” who is “independent of the executive and the legislature,” and who 
in the exercise of his responsibilities “provides an important control of the 
activities of the intercepting agencies and of the Secretary of State 
himself.”247 
With respect to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, the sole domestic 
forum authorized to entertain complaints of unlawful surveillance, the court 
described the IPT as “an independent and impartial body,” and noted that it 
was composed of persons who “hold or have held high judicial office or [are] 
experienced lawyers.”248  The court also emphasized the IPT’s accessibility, 
noting that it is a body to which “any person who suspects that his 
communications have been or are being intercepted may apply,” irrespective 
of whether they have been notified of that fact.249  Finally, the court noted 
that there was “no evidence of any significant shortcomings in the 
application and operation of the surveillance regime.”250  It concluded that 
[h]aving regard to the safeguards [offered] by the supervision 
of the Commissioner and the review of the IPT, the impugned 
surveillance measures, insofar as they may have been applied 
to the applicant in the circumstances outlined in the present 
case, are justified under Article 8(2).251 
B.  The Article 6 Complaint 
RIPA 2000 established the Investigatory Powers Tribunal and conferred 
upon it exclusive jurisdiction to entertain complaints from individuals who 
believe they have been the target of unlawful governmental wiretapping or 
                                                                                                                   
 246 Id. para. 167.  The court’s preference for judicial supervision was first enunciated in its 
decision in Klass.  See Klass, App. No. 58243/00, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. para.56.  
 247 Kennedy, App. No. 26839/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 166.  
 248 Id. para. 167.  
 249 Id.  
 250 Id. para. 169.  The court’s purpose in making this point was to signal its willingness to 
distinguish the way in which RIPA operated in practice from the way in which surveillance 
was conducted in countries in which statutory controls on executive branch activities were 
impressive on their face but evidently ignored in practice.  For further discussion, see infra 
notes 302–16 and accompanying text. 
 251 Kennedy, App. No. 26839/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 169. 
288 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 44:237 
 
 
other forms of covert surveillance.252  The law also confers on the Secretary 
of State the power to draft the rules under which the tribunal will operate.253  
In October of 2000, in conjunction with RIPA’s coming into force, the 
Secretary of State promulgated the Tribunal’s Rules.254   
The Rules prescribed that when the IPT agrees to investigate an 
individual complaint, it “may” hold oral hearings, including hearings at 
which “the complainant may make representations,” but it is under no duty to 
do so.  Further, the tribunal is authorized to hold “separate oral hearings.”255  
Should the tribunal choose to hold a separate hearing to which the 
government alone is invited, it is authorized to not disclose “to the 
complainant or to any other person” the fact it has held, or proposes to hold, 
such a hearing.256  It is also permitted to not disclose 
to the complainant or to any other person . . . any information 
or document disclosed or provided to the Tribunal in the course 
of that hearing, or the identity of any witness at that hearing.257   
Finally, the tribunal is instructed that its “proceedings, including any oral 
hearings, shall be conducted in private.”258  
Kennedy’s complaint to the IPT had argued that Article 6 of the ECHR 
required that the tribunal’s proceedings must be adversarial in nature and 
open to the public.  Article 6 guarantees to everyone “a fair and public 
hearing [by] an independent and impartial tribunal.”259  Kennedy argued that 
this required that the tribunal’s proceedings take the form of a public oral 
hearing with mutual disclosure and inspection of the parties’ evidence, that 
oral evidence be open to cross-examination, and that “following its final 
determination, the IPT [should] state its findings and give reasons for its 
conclusions on each relevant issue.”260  Most of these requests, of course, 
were wholly at odds with the constraints under which the tribunal had been 
instructed to operate by the Secretary of State. 
                                                                                                                   
 252 RIPA 2000, supra note 157, § 65.  
 253 Id. § 69(1)(a).  
 254 Investigatory Powers Tribunal Rules, 2000, S.I. 2000/2665 (U.K.). 
 255 Id. art. 9(2)–(4). 
 256 Id. art. 6(2)(a). 
 257 Id. art. 6(2)(b).  
 258 Id. art. 9(6). 
 259 ECHR, supra note 9, art. 6(1). 
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The government defended the IPT’s operating procedures on the ground 
“the overarching consideration was that an individual could not be notified of 
interception measures while interception was ongoing or where notification 
would jeopardise the capabilities or operations of intercepting agencies.”261  
It reminded the ECtHR that RIPA conferred on the IPT “full powers to 
obtain any material it considered necessary from relevant bodies,” including 
the police, the intelligence agencies, and the Secretary of State, and it 
insisted that “the procedure before the IPT offered as fair a procedure as 
could be achieved in the context of secret surveillance powers.”262 
The ECtHR prefaced its conclusions on the Article 6 question by noting 
that in prior decisions it had held that “restrictions on the right to a fully 
adversarial procedure [were permissible] where strictly necessary.”263  It also 
“emphasise[d] that [IPT] proceedings related to secret surveillance measures 
and that there was therefore a need to keep secret sensitive and confidential 
information.”264  This consideration, the court said, “justifies restrictions in 
the IPT proceedings.”265  In the court’s view, the question was “whether the 
restrictions, taken as a whole, were disproportionate or impaired the very 
essence of the applicant’s right to a fair trial.”266 
The court then turned to specific rules that governed the IPT’s 
investigation of individual complaints.  First, the court considered the 
tribunal’s strict limitations on the disclosure to the complainant of any 
information provided to the tribunal, or even disclosure to the complainant of 
the fact that the tribunal had held, or was proposing to hold, a separate oral 
hearing to which the government alone would be invited.  The court agreed 
with the government that the alternatives, such as disclosure of redacted 
documents or the appointment of special advocates, would not solve the 
problem, because they could not “achieve[ ] the aim of preserving the 
secrecy of whether any interception had taken place.”267  The court also 
agreed with the government that conferring on the tribunal the discretion to 
refuse to hold oral hearings at all was compatible with Article 6.268  Finally, 
the court endorsed the government’s strict policy of refraining from 
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providing post-surveillance notification to any targeted persons, even in 
criminal investigations, and of neither confirming nor denying, in court or 
anywhere else, that interception of communications had ever occurred.  It 
held that these goals “could be circumvented if an application to the IPT 
resulted in a complainant being advised whether interception had taken 
place.  In the circumstances, it is sufficient that the applicant be advised that 
no determination has been in his favour.”269  The court then reached its 
overall conclusion that “the restrictions on the applicant’s rights in the 
context of the proceedings before the IPT were both necessary and 
proportionate and did not impair the very essence of the applicant’s Article 6 
rights.”270 
C.  Conclusion 
The ECtHR’s decision in Kennedy constituted a ringing endorsement of 
the Convention-compatibility of the RIPA regime for interception of 
communications in the United Kingdom.  RIPA authorizes the government to 
engage in interception of communications within the United Kingdom in 
both criminal investigations and intelligence-gathering operations.  The 
Secretary of State for the Home Department is empowered to issue 
interception warrants to both the police and counter-intelligence officials 
provided he or she believes that it is “necessary” and “proportionate” to do 
so in order to accomplish one or more of three broad objectives.271  The 
ECtHR upheld the RIPA provisions authorizing executive warrants and 
endorsed the mechanisms established by RIPA—including the Interception 
of Communications Commissioner and the Investigatory Powers Tribunal—
to oversee the Secretary of State’s exercise of the warrant-granting power.  In 
addition, the court upheld the arrangements for the nearly complete secrecy 
that surrounds the IPT’s operations in the exercise of its jurisdiction to 
investigate citizens’ complaints of unlawful surveillance by government 
officials.  The court concluded unanimously that RIPA’s complex and 
distinctive mix of powers and safeguards rendered the British approach to 
interception of communications and other forms of covert surveillance 
                                                                                                                   
 269 Id. para. 189. 
 270 Id. para. 190. 
 271 RIPA 2000, supra note 157, § 5(2). 
2016]  JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT OF INTERPRETATION OF COMMUNICATIONS  291 
 
 
“necessary in a democratic society” and, as such, compatible with both 
Article 6 and Article 8 of the ECHR.272 
V.  COMPARING BRITISH AND AMERICAN SURVEILLANCE LAW 
It is time to venture some comparative conclusions about the merits of the 
respective systems of authorization and oversight of interception of 
communications in the United Kingdom and the United States.  To do so, it 
is instructive to look, first, at the structures, procedures, and actual operation 
of the two systems, and, second, at statistics on the per capita incidence of 
wiretapping in Britain, the United States, and other jurisdictions. 
A.  Structures, Procedures, and Operational Realities 
In the United States, wiretap orders in criminal investigations are sought 
from a state or federal judge pursuant to procedures established by Title III.  
In operations aimed at acquiring foreign intelligence information, the 
government is required to seek interception orders from a judge of the FISA 
                                                                                                                   
 272 Kennedy, App. No. 26839/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. paras.169–170.  Despite receiving the 
approval of the ECtHR for their current surveillance regime, policy makers in the UK are on 
the verge of instituting major changes.  In 2015, and in direct response to Edward Snowden’s 
2013 revelations, three major reports were issued. First, the Intelligence and Security 
Committee issued a report advocating retention of the existing system of ministerial 
authorization for interception warrants. See INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE, 
PRIVACY AND SECURITY: A MODERN AND TRANSPARENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK, 2015, H.C., at 7, 
73–76 (U.K.).  That same year, David Anderson, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism 
Legislation, also issued a report advocating the establishment of an Independent Surveillance 
and Intelligence Commission (ISIC). See DAVID ANDERSON, ISIC, REPORT OF THE 
INVESTIGATORY POWERS REVIEW: A QUESTION OF TRUST 6–8 (2015), available at https:// 
www.gov.uk/government/publications/a-question-of-trust-report-of-the-investigatory-powers-
review.  Members of the Commission—termed “Judicial Commissioners”—would take over 
direct responsibility for approval of interception warrants in criminal cases and “national 
security [cases] of a domestic nature.”  Id. at 274.  In cases in which the Secretary of State 
certified that a warrant was required in the interests of “the defence and/or foreign policy of 
the UK,” a Judicial Commissioner would exercise judicial review—presumably rather lenient 
judicial review—of the Secretary of State’s certification.  See id. at 270–75.  Finally, the 
Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI) also issued a report 
recommending a “composite approach” similar to that advocated by David Anderson.  See 
RUSI, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT SURVEILLANCE REVIEW: A DEMOCRATIC LICENCE TO 
OPERATE 81–83, 97–100, 111–12 (2015), available at https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/ 
ISR-Report-press.pdf. For a brief discussion of the response of the Cameron and May 
Governments and Parliament to the foregoing recommendations, as of October 2016, see infra 
notes 317–29 and accompanying text. 
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Court.  In the United Kingdom, all requests for authority to engage in 
interception of communications within the country are directed to the 
Secretary of State for the Home Department.  The Home Secretary is solely 
responsible for issuing interception warrants not only to the Security Service 
for intelligence-gathering purposes but also to the police for ordinary 
criminal investigations. 
The interception regimes of both the United States and the United 
Kingdom therefore require operations-level executive branch law 
enforcement and counter-intelligence officials to seek prior approval from a 
third party for their decisions to resort to wiretapping.  However, the United 
States has embraced a decentralized system of judicial pre-approval that 
owes its origins to perceived abuses of the warrant-granting power on the 
part of British secretaries of state in the eighteenth century.  In contrast, the 
United Kingdom has chosen to vest power in the official whose conduct 
prompted the Americans to become leading proponents, in the latter half of 
the twentieth century, of the supposed virtues of judicial oversight of the use 
of electronic surveillance. 
Which system does a better job of achieving the oft-repeated goal of 
striking a “proper balance” between the need to combat crime and protect 
national security, on the one hand, and the need to safeguard citizens’ 
privacy rights, on the other?  The answer is not obvious.  On the one hand, a 
centralized system of interception warrants would seem by definition to 
heighten the risk that government surveillance could be directed at political 
dissidents or could otherwise be used for improper or oppressive purposes.  
On the other hand, as the authors of the Birkett Report remarked, it is 
arguable that in a decentralized system in which “a number of magistrates or 
judges [have] the power to issue such warrants, the control of the use to 
which methods of interception can be put would be weaker than under the 
present system.”273  On this issue, it is only fair to say that we do not know, 
in the abstract and with certainty, which system is superior. 
What can be said is that the decentralization of the American system, at 
least in federal cases, is easily exaggerated.  Warrant requests are funneled 
through the Electronic Surveillance Unit of the Office of Enforcement 
Operations of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, after 
which they are presented to the Attorney General or a specially designated 
high-level Justice Department official for signature.274  In the case of the 
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FISA Court, applications are prepared and filed by the National Security 
Division of the Justice Department and require the approval of the Attorney 
General.275  In the United States, therefore, the DOJ is responsible for 
“quality control” of warrant applications, and, at least within individual 
presidential administrations, there is probably substantial consistency in the 
standards to which warrant applications are held prior to being forwarded to 
the chambers of individual federal judges.276  On its face, the process of 
preparing warrant requests for such judges bears a striking resemblance to 
the steps taken by the British Home Office in preparing warrant requests for 
eventual submission to the Secretary of State.277 
1.  Operational Realities of the Warrant-Granting Process 
What do we know about how state and federal judges in the United States 
and the Secretary of State in the United Kingdom actually exercise their 
warrant-granting power?  The answer, it seems, is quite a lot but not nearly 
enough. 
In both the United States and the United Kingdom, raw statistics on the 
ease of gaining approval for wiretapping are accessible and fairly 
straightforward.  In the United States, between 1968 and the end of 2013, 
state and federal judges authorized some 55,386 interception warrants 
pursuant to Title III.278  In that same period, judges denied a total of thirty-
nine warrant requests.279  In the FISA Court, between 1979 and 2011, judges 
approved a total of 32,087 government applications for authority to conduct 
electronic surveillance and/or physical searches for foreign intelligence 
purposes.280  In that period, a total of twelve applications were rejected.281 
                                                                                                                   
 275 See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text. 
 276 Whether there is comparable consistency in the content and caliber of warrant 
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thirds of Title III approvals—is another question.  See infra notes 278–79, 297 and 
accompanying text. 
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 278 See Electronic Privacy Information Center, EPIC, Title II Wiretap Orders: Electronic 
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Turning to the United Kingdom, in the decade between 2001 and the end 
of 2010, the Home Secretary issued a total of 16,668 warrants for domestic 
interception of communications.282  It is safe to assume that few requests are 
denied.  However, little information is available on this question in the 
Annual Reports of the Interception of Communications Commissioner.  In 
his Annual Report for 2010, for instance, the Commissioner noted only that 
“[t]he outright refusal of an application is rare,” but he provided no further 
details.283 
The bottom line is that in both the United States and the United Kingdom, 
the ratio of warrant denials to warrant approvals is miniscule.  This does little 
more, however, than raise the perennial question of whether the low rate of 
denials is the product of hopelessly lenient standards for approving 
interception warrants or is instead a reflection of the self-restraint and 
professionalism of operations-level executive branch officials.  Civil 
libertarians are quick to embrace the former explanation.  Government 
officials are equally fond of the latter explanation.  Arriving at a true 
assessment of whether a particular system of surveillance authorization and 
oversight exhibits a satisfactory level of rigor in balancing privacy against 
security and public order is not an easy task. 
2.  Ex Post Scrutiny of Authorized Wiretapping 
The situation is not significantly improved if we examine what we know 
about ex post scrutiny of the merits of granted warrants.  With respect to 
FISA Court orders, post-surveillance notification of targets does not occur 
unless the government elects to prosecute the target for a criminal offense.284  
As a result, most FISA surveillance begins and ends without anyone other 
                                                                                                                   
 282 This figure is calculated from statistics published in the Interception of Communications 
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than the FISA Court and the government being aware of that fact.  When 
prosecutions do occur, defendants are informed that the government intends 
to rely on FISA-derived evidence, and, in about 35–40 cases, they have 
sought disclosure.  However, no defendant has ever succeeded in gaining 
access to any “applications or orders or other materials,” let alone in 
convincing a judge to order suppression of the resulting evidence.285 
Title III includes a much more expansive post-surveillance notification 
requirement than FISA.286  Thus, there are numerous opportunities for 
defendants (and others) to challenge the merits of a Title III interception 
order.  The problem here is the enormity of the data set.  In the FISA context, 
Professor Patricia L. Bellia has highlighted the complete absence of 
successful challenges to the introduction of FISA-derived evidence.287  After 
doing so, she adds that “[a]lthough suppression is also quite rare in the Title 
III context, the sheer number of suppression motions under Title III makes 
tabulation and comparison impossible.”288 
Focusing strictly on the United States, therefore, the absence of 
substantive information about the soundness of the warrant-granting 
decisions of FISA Court judges, combined with the unwieldy amount of 
information about the fate of Title III challenges, makes it difficult to 
compare the warrant-granting behavior of federal judges presiding over 
criminal cases to that of federal judges who serve on the FISA Court.  In 
cases governed solely by Title III, the sheer quantity of relevant judicial 
decisions inhibits ready comparison of the behavior of federal judges to that 
of their state court counterparts. 
It is equally difficult to reach objective comparative conclusions about the 
care or professionalism with which American judges and British secretaries 
of state execute their warrant-granting responsibilities.  With respect to the 
response of British secretaries of state to warrant requests, this Article has 
already noted the Commissioner’s concession that “[t]he outright refusal of 
an application is rare.”289  However, no specific information on the ratio of 
grants to denials is publicly available, and thus the behavior of the Secretary 
of State and that of American judges cannot easily be compared, apart from 
noting that requests for warrants are very rarely denied in either jurisdiction. 
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As for ex post scrutiny of alleged unlawful interception in the United 
Kingdom, once the Home Secretary agrees to issue a warrant, challenges to 
its lawfulness are channeled exclusively to the Interception of 
Communications Tribunal (between 1986 and 2000) and the Investigatory 
Powers Tribunal (2000 to the present).  There are gaps in our knowledge, but 
it does not appear that any allegation of unlawful telephone tapping 
submitted to the ICA between 1986 and 2000 was upheld.290  With the 
passage of RIPA 2000, the IPT assumed responsibility for hearing 
complaints about various types of surveillance, including, but not limited to, 
interception of communications.  In 2005, the Tribunal upheld a complaint 
for the first time, and it has upheld a handful of other complaints since; 
however, none of the successful complaints alleged that the government was 
engaged in unlawful telephone tapping.291  Thus, it does not appear that any 
complaint of such tapping has ever been upheld.  
3.  Conclusion 
Our ability to reach meaningful conclusions about the relative merits of 
the British and American systems of interception of communications is 
severely hampered by several features of the two systems.  Analysis in both 
systems is handicapped by the enigmatic significance of the near-perfect 
record of executive officials in gaining approval for their warrant requests.  
In addition, both jurisdictions are notable for the secrecy that surrounds key 
components of their warrant-granting and warrant-reviewing processes.  
Finally, the sheer magnitude of the body of judicial and other decisions 
requiring scrutiny frustrates meaningful analysis.  In the end, the only hope 
for shedding light on the operational merits of the two systems may be to 
devise an in-depth field study or a massive empirical study.  In the meantime, 
we know that interception of communications in the United States requires a 
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judicial warrant and interception in the United Kingdom requires an 
executive warrant and that warrant requests from executive branch officials 
in both jurisdictions are rarely denied.  Beyond that, the available 
information is either overwhelming in scope, difficult to interpret, or 
unavailable. 
B.  The Incidence of Wiretapping 
Another approach to comparing the British and American surveillance 
regimes to one another—and to regimes in operation in other countries—is to 
look at statistics on the per capita incidence of authorized governmental 
wiretapping.  This method of drawing comparisons is not without 
weaknesses, because there will be national differences in the way in which 
wiretap statistics are compiled and other factors that could produce 
misleading conclusions.  Nevertheless, it is instructive to examine what we 
know about the incidence of wiretapping in various jurisdictions as one way 
of assessing the relationship between citizens and their governments and the 
extent to which individual privacy is or is not adequately protected. 
1.  Wiretapping in the United States 
In the United States, wiretap orders approved pursuant to Title III are 
reported annually in the Wiretap Report of the Director of the Administrative 
Office of the United States Courts, which includes statistics on orders issued 
by both state and federal judges.292  Basic information on the number of 
applications to the FISA Court for authority to conduct electronic 
surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes is reported annually in a letter 
from the Department of Justice to congressional leaders.293 
As noted above, a total of 55,386 Title III warrants were issued by state 
and federal judges between 1968 and 2013.294  Therefore, in the forty-six 
year history of Title III, state and federal judges have issued an average of 
about 1,204 warrants per year.  Between 1979 and 2013, the FISA Court 
                                                                                                                   
 292 See, e.g., ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, WIRETAP REPORT 2014, http://www.uscourts. 
gov/statistics-reports/wiretap-report-2014. 
 293 For an example of a letter requesting authority, see PETER J. KADZIK, DOJ, APPLICATIONS 
MADE TO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT DURING CALENDAR YEAR 2014 
(2014), available at https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2014rept.pdf. 
 294 See supra note 278 and accompanying text. 
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approved a total of 35,434 government applications for a FISA order.295  
Thus, FISA Court orders have averaged roughly 1,012 per year. 
Predictably, the number of Title III warrants has risen—from an average 
of 679 per year in the twelve years between 1970 and 1981 to an average of 
1,933 in the twelve years between 2000 and 2011.296  Thus, the frequency of 
the issuance of such warrants has approximately tripled.297  Between 1980 
and 1991, the FISA Court approved an average of 530 orders per year.298  In 
the recent twelve-year period between 2000 and 2011, the court averaged 
1,666 approvals per year.  Thus, FISA Court orders, like Title III warrants, 
have approximately tripled.299 
In the twelve-year period between 2000 and 2011, the combined average 
of Title III warrants and FISA Court orders issued every year—1,933 Title 
III warrants plus 1,666 FISA Court orders—is about 3,600.  Assuming a U.S. 
population of 300 million people, state and federal courts and the FISA Court 
thus issue about 1.2 interception warrants/orders per 100,000 persons per 
year for the purpose of domestic collection of evidence of criminal activity 
and domestic collection of foreign intelligence information. 
2.  Wiretapping in the United Kingdom 
In the decade between 2001 and 2010, the Home Secretary issued 16,668 
warrants for domestic interception of communications for the purpose of 
combating serious crime and/or protecting national security.300  In recent 
years, therefore, the average number of warrants issued every year has been 
                                                                                                                   
 295 See supra note 280 and accompanying text. 
 296 I have excluded 1968 and 1969 from this calculation, because Title III warrants increased 
rapidly (from 174 in 1968 to 596 in 1970) in the initial period of the operation of the 
legislation. 
 297 In both the recent twelve-year period and over the forty-six-year history of Title III, 
warrants issued by state judges have been approximately twice as numerous as warrants issued 
by federal judges. 
 298 I have excluded 1979 from this calculation, because the Court did not operate for the full 
year. 
 299 This may seem surprising, given the presumed impact of September 11 on the activity of 
the FISA Court.  It becomes less surprising when account is taken of the fact that investigation 
of drug offenses is the dominant purpose of the issuance of Title III warrants and that such 
offenses have arguably increased at a faster pace than terrorist threats.  In 2012, for instance, 
“87 percent of all applications for intercepts [cited] illegal drugs as the most serious offense 
under investigation.”  ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, WIRETAP REPORT 2012, available at 
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 300 See supra note 282 and accompanying text. 
2016]  JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT OF INTERPRETATION OF COMMUNICATIONS  299 
 
 
about 1,666.  Taking this figure at face value, and assuming a population of 
about 60 million people, the Secretary of State issues about 2.75 warrants per 
year per 100,000 persons.  The incidence of the issuance of interception 
warrants thus appears to be a little over twice as great in the United Kingdom 
as in the United States.301 
3.  Wiretapping in Other Jurisdictions 
To put these statistics in perspective, it is useful to examine what we 
know about the incidence of wiretapping in other jurisdictions.  For this 
purpose, we can turn to recent ECtHR decisions on interception of 
communications in Bulgaria and Moldova. 
  a.  Bulgaria 
In 2007, the ECtHR examined the Convention-compatibility of Bulgaria’s 
Special Surveillance Means Act of 1997 (SSMA) and also examined the 
manner in which the law operated in practice.302  The SSMA authorized 
various police and internal security agencies to engage in wiretapping, and 
judges were given responsibility for issuing warrants.  After the issuance of a 
warrant, however, control of the surveillance process reverted to the Minister 
of Internal Affairs.303  In addition, according to the court, “under Bulgarian 
law the persons subjected to secret surveillance are not notified of this fact at 
any point in time and under any circumstances.”304 
The ECtHR held that the SSMA, even as written, failed to satisfy the 
requirement of Article 8(2) of the ECHR that any interference with rights 
protected by Article 8(1) must be “in accordance with the law.”305  After 
reviewing its precedents on “foreseeability” and “compatibility with the rule 
                                                                                                                   
 301 One must be very cautious about drawing conclusions from a statistic such as this.  To 
mention only one confounding factor, there is every reason to believe that the threat from 
indigenous terrorists is substantially greater in Britain than in the United States. For a 
discussion of the perils of relying on reported statistics to compare surveillance regimes in 
various jurisdictions, see Schwartz, supra note 11, at 1250–54; Schwartz, supra note 60, at 
758–64. 
 302 Ass’n for European Integration and Human Rights and Ekimdzhiev v. Bulgaria, App. No. 
62540/00, 533 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-81323.  
Bulgaria ratified the European Convention on Human Rights, and accepted the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights, in 1992. 
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of law,”306 the court noted that “while in certain respects Bulgarian law fully 
comports with the above requirements, in other respects it falls short.”307  In 
particular, the court found fault with the fact that control of surveillance 
reverted to the Ministry of Internal Affairs following its initial authorization 
by a judge.308 
The ECtHR also reviewed statistics on the number of wiretap warrants 
issued by judges in the first place.  It noted that a report issued by the 
Bulgarian Supreme Cassation Prosecutor’s Office found that in a two-year 
period from 1999 through 2000, “more than 10,000 warrants were issued, 
[and] that number does not even include the tapping of mobile phones.”309  
Taken at face value, and based on a population of approximately 7.3 million, 
the incidence of wiretapping in Bulgaria therefore works out to more than 
seventy orders per 100,000 persons.  If true, this means that the per capita 
use of wiretapping in Bulgaria is roughly twenty-five times greater than in 
the United Kingdom and more than fifty-five times greater than in the United 
States.  The court’s conclusion was that compared to other countries, “the 
system of secret surveillance in Bulgaria is, to say the least, overused.”310 
  b.  Moldova 
Moldova ratified the ECHR in 1997.  In 2002, members of a non-
governmental organization called “Lawyers for Human Rights” filed an 
application with the ECtHR alleging that Moldovan law governing telephone 
tapping violated Article 8 of the ECHR.  Their challenge to Moldovan law 
was resolved by the ECtHR in 2009.311 
In Iordachi, the court examined Moldova’s Operational Investigative 
Activities Act.  The law prescribed that investigative measures “which 
infringe lawful rights,” including the secrecy of telephone conversations, 
“shall be permitted [only] with the authorisation of the investigating 
judge.”312  A separate statute, the Code of Criminal Procedure, required that 
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“after the end of an authorized interception [the] judge shall inform in 
writing the persons whose conversations were intercepted.”313 
In their application to the ECtHR, the lawyers challenging the Moldovan 
regime of interception of communications told the court that in their 
experience “no investigating judge had ever complied” with the obligation to 
provide post-surveillance notification to persons whose telephone calls had 
been intercepted.314  In addition, they provided the court with a letter from 
the Head of the President’s Office of the Supreme Court of Justice indicating 
that investigating judges had granted an average of 2,274 interception 
authorizations per year in 2005–2007.315  In a country of 3.5 million, this 
translates into roughly 65 authorizations per 100,000 inhabitants, and it 
prompted the court to remark, as it had in AEIHR and Ekimdzhiev, that the 
“figures show that the system of secret surveillance in Moldova is, to say the 
least, overused.”316 
4.  Conclusion 
The ECtHR’s decisions in AEIHR and Ekimdzhiev and in Iordachi are a 
reminder that historical experience and political culture can play a major role 
in the operation of a country’s surveillance regime, however much its 
statutory components may resemble an American-style system requiring 
judicial pre-approval and other safeguards against abuse of citizens’ privacy 
rights.  On its face, the Bulgarian system included judicial pre-approval of 
wiretap decisions.  The Moldovan system included judicial pre-approval of 
wiretap decisions and post-surveillance notification by an investigating judge 
of the targets of covert surveillance.  In practice, however, both systems 
exhibited serious weaknesses, and it was apparent to the ECtHR that neither 
system had yet achieved much success in escaping the baleful effects of its 
totalitarian past. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The American system of authorized governmental interception of 
communications—consisting not only of judicial pre-approval of executive 
branch wiretapping decisions but also of innumerable individual decisions by 
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both state and federal judges—stands in marked contrast to the concentration 
of warrant-granting power in the hands of a single executive official in the 
United Kingdom.  The American system of judicial pre-approval is self-
evidently more attractive to civil libertarians.  In addition, the British system 
exhibits a higher level of secrecy than the American system (although the 
differences are not substantial in the case of covert surveillance aimed at 
gathering intelligence and countering threats to national security).  For this 
reason as well, the American system is preferred by groups and individuals 
who put a high premium on protection of privacy. 
Looking at the systems as a whole, however, it is surprisingly difficult to 
conclude that one is significantly more successful than the other at striking 
the proper balance between the needs of the state and the rights of the 
individual.  While interception of communications in the United Kingdom is 
firmly controlled by the government and thoroughly shrouded in secrecy, 
executive branch officials operate within an elaborate system of judicial, or 
at least “quasi-judicial,” safeguards.  The roles that the Commissioner and 
the IPT play in overseeing interception of communications contrast rather 
sharply with role of judges in the more widely used American system.  
However, both the Commissioner and the members of the IPT boast 
impressive legal and judicial credentials.  Moreover, the statutory role they 
play, in conjunction with the Secretary of State’s personal responsibility for 
issuing interception warrants, has persuaded the ECtHR that there exist in the 
British system “adequate and effective guarantees against abuse.”  Most 
observers agree that permitting government to engage in interception of 
communication is a “necessary evil.”  That being the case, Britain and the 
United States have probably done as sound a job as any modern jurisdiction 
of crafting effective arrangements for simultaneously protecting the privacy 
rights of individuals at whom such interception is directed. 
Postscript 
On November 4, 2015, the British Home Secretary, Teresa May, 
published the Cameron Government’s “Draft Investigatory Powers Bill.”317 
The Government accepted some, but not all, of the recommendations of three 
reports published the previous summer.318  In particular, the Government 
proposed to establish a “double-lock” system whereby interception warrants 
for both law enforcement and national security purposes would continue to 
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be issued by the Secretary of State but could not come into force until 
approved by a Judicial Commissioner, who would be a serving or former 
High Court judge.319  In addition, the Investigatory Powers Tribunal would 
be retained, but there would be a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal on a 
point of law from a determination of the tribunal.320  However, leave to 
appeal would need to be granted by the IPT, or, if refused, by the Court of 
Appeal.321  In addition, leave to appeal could not be granted by either the IPT 
or the Court of Appeal unless it considers that “the appeal would raise an 
important point of principle or practice [or] there is another compelling 
reason for granting leave.”322  
Following publication of the Draft Bill, Parliament appointed an ad hoc 
Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill, which held hearings 
between November 30, 2015, and January 13, 2016.323  On February 11, 
2016, the Joint Committee published its report.324  The Committee noted that 
“[t]he draft Bill introduces an extra layer of judicial authorisation for powers 
that have previously been subject to ministerial authorisation only,” and it 
concluded that it was “satisfied that a case has been made for having a 
‘double-lock’ authorisation for targeted interception.”325 
The Committee raised questions, however, about other aspects of the draft 
Bill, including the role assigned to Judicial Commissioners in conducting 
general oversight of the warrant-granting system (as distinct from their role 
in approving the Secretary of State’s decisions to issue individual 
warrants),326 the limited scope of the right to appeal from decisions of the 
Investigatory Powers Tribunal,327 and the Government’s decision to 
perpetuate a high level of secrecy in connection with deliberations of the 
Tribunal.328  The Home Office considered the Committee’s report and other 
responses to its draft Bill and submitted revised legislation to Parliament on 
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March 1, 2016.  By the beginning of October 2016, the Bill—to be known as 
the Investigatory Powers Act 2016—had completed most of the stages of 
parliamentary scrutiny and was expected to be enacted into law by the end of 
the year.329 
                                                                                                                   
  329 A running account of the progress of Parliament’s deliberations is published at http:// 
services.parliament.uk/bills/2015-16/investigatorypowers.html. 
